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Abstract
The U.S. economy has experienced a significant drop in the fraction of the population employed in
middle wage, “routine task-intensive” occupations. Applying machine learning techniques, we identify
characteristics of those who used to be employed in such occupations and show they are now less likely
to work in routine occupations. Instead, they are either non-participants in the labor force or working
at occupations that tend to occupy the bottom of the wage distribution. We then develop a quantitative,
heterogeneous agent, general equilibrium model of labor force participation, occupational choice, and
capital investment. This allows us to quantify the role of advancement in automation technology in
accounting for these labor market changes. We then use this framework as a laboratory to evaluate
various public policies aimed at addressing the disappearance of routine employment and its consequent
impacts on inequality.
Keywords: Polarization, Automation, Routine Employment, Labor Force Participation, Universal
Basic Income, Unemployment Insurance, Retraining.
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1. Introduction
Advances in automation technologies have left an indelible mark on the labor market of the U.S. and other
industrialized economies over the past 40 years. An important literature demonstrates that these economies
have experienced a significant drop in the fraction of the population employed in jobs in the middle of
the occupational wage distribution (see, for instance, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), Goos and Manning
(2007), Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009), Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). This hollowing out of the
middle is linked to the decline of employment in routine occupations—those that focus on a limited set of
tasks that can be performed by following a well-defined set of instructions and procedures. The routine
nature of these tasks make them prime candidates to be performed by automation technologies (see Autor,
Levy and Murnane (2003), and the subsequent literature).
This paper contributes to our understanding of this phenomenon along three dimensions. First, we apply
machine learning techniques that allow us identify who are the workers with “routine occupational character-
istics.” With this chracterization in hand we track the labor market outcomes of the this type of individuals.
Our key empirical findings is that the likelihood of this type of individuals to work in routine occupations has
fallen significantly. Instead, they are now either non-participants in the labor force or working at occupations
that tend to occupy the bottom of the wage distribution.
What is causing this change in the likelihood to work in routine, middle-class, occupations? While there
is ample research identifying technological change and automation as the primary factor, there could natu-
rally be other complementary forces (see Section 2 for a discussion). Our second contribution is to quantify
the specific role of automation. To do so, we develop in the second part of the paper a quantitive hetero-
geneous agent general equilibrium model of labor force participation, occupational choice, unemployment,
and investment dynamics. We find that automation accounts for about half of the fall in the likelihood of
working in routine occupations that we document for routine type individuals. Moreover, we use the model
to study the aggregate and distributional effects of automation both in terms of allocations and welfare.
Given that we find an important quantitative role for automation, our third contribution is to use our
new framework as a “laboratory” to evaluate various public policy proposals, where, given the general
equilibrium emphasis of the model, each of the policies we consider must be financed through increased
government distortionary taxation.
In what follows, we discuss each of these three parts in detail. In Section 2, we use data from the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) during the "pre-polarization" period of 1984-1989, to train a random forest
algorithm to classify individuals in an agnostic manner. The algorithm classifies individuals into different
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categories based on their “occupational likelihoods” allowing us to identify routine occupational character-
istics. With this mapping we then track the evolution of individuals with such characteristics over time, and
ask what has happened to the type of workers who would otherwise be employed in routine occupations
during the "post-polarization" era. Are “routine-type” workers employed in different occupations now than
they used to be? Do they tend to participate less in the labor force than they used to? Are they more often
unemployed than they used to be?
Our key finding is that such routine-type individuals have experienced a fall of about 16% in the likelihood
of working in routine occupations between the pre-polarization era and the post-polarization one. This
decline in the likelihood of routine employment must be offset by an increase in the likelihood of being in
other labor market statuses; we find that instead of working in routine occupations, about two-thirds of such
individuals have ended up as non-participants in the labor force, with the remaining one-third employed
in non-routine manual occupations (that tend to be at the bottom of the occupational wage distribution).
Interestingly, we find that the unemployment rates for such workers remained roughly unchanged. We
complement this analysis using the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY) 1979 and 1997. We
show that similar patterns are observed for young low cognitive ability workers (as measured by AFQT
scores), who used to work in routine occupations in the late 1980s.
These findings guide the setup and calibration of a general equilibrium model which we present in Section
3. We have three goals in mind. First, we use the model as a measurement device in order to quantify
the specific role of automation in the fall in the likelihood of working in routine occupations for these
individuals. Second, we use the model to assess the distributional effects of advanced automation. Third,
we use the model to quantify the effects of various policy reforms. In what follows we briefly describe
below the structure of the model and the main results.
Given our quantitative goal, we focus on a tangible measure of automation and its technological progress—
specifically, information-and-communication-technology (ICT) capital that has been shown to capture var-
ious aggregate trends when embedded into a macroeconomic model (e.g., shares in overall investment and
labor shares of national income; see Eden and Gaggl (2018)). Firms invest optimally in capital, so that the
degree of ICT adoption/automation is endogenous.
Since occupational employment is central to our analysis and empirical findings, we consider a model
with three occupations: (i) non-routine cognitive (NRC), (ii) routine (R), and (iii) NRM, that represent high,
middle, and low paying jobs, respectively.1 In the model, individuals with routine occupational character-
istics (i.e. those who cannot work as NRC) vary in terms of their work ability in R and NRM occupations.
1See for instance, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), Goos and Manning (2007), and Jaimovich and Siu (2012)).
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Based on their abilities and equilibrium wages, workers optimally decide whether or not to participate in
the labor force and, conditional on participating, sort into occupations. Labor force participants are either
employed or unemployed due to search-and-matching frictions (Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1985)). Given our interest in policy analysis, we introduce labor market frictions since certain
interventions are targeted at the unemployed, while others affect the relative value of unemployment versus
other labor market statuses. All government programs are financed with labor income and profit taxation.
Importantly, the substitutability between ICT capital and R occupational labor is disciplined by the data
and any channel that affects firms optimal adoption of ICT capital affects the return to be working in a R vs.
NRM occupation and the return to labor force participation.
We characterize the model equilibrium in Section 4 and discuss calibration and quantitative results in
Section 5. We find that the price decline of ICT since 1989 can account for about 50% of the decline in R
employment. Moreover, our model results indicate a the presence of significant heterogeneity in the welfare
implications of automation; workers who used to work in R occupations see a significant decline in their
wages, and thus in their welfare. On the other hand, due to complementarity with automation technology ,
and to the capital ownership structure in the economy, NRC workers see large increases in their welfare.
In Section 6, the model is used as a laboratory to evaluate the aggregate and distributional effects of vari-
ous policies. We consider two sets of policies where each is funded by distortionary taxation. First, we study
the effect of an “occupational retraining” policy that is aimed at counteracting the effects of automation. The
program is aimed at labor force non-participants, improving their ability in NRM work. The policy induces
workers back into the labor market, and improves their welfare. But this harms others: a displacement effect
implies that newly trained workers compete with those who already selected, prior to the retraining program,
into NRM work, pushing down their wages, employment, and welfare.
The second set of policies are explicitly redistributive, transferring resources from high-wage workers
(who, as the model shows, significantly benefit from automation) to middle- and low-wage workers. In these
experiments, the unemployment margin plays a critical role. We consider: (i) increasing unemployment
insurance benefits, (ii) introducing a universal basic income, (iii) increasing transfers to labor force non-
participants, and (iv) changes in the progressivity of the tax system. While (i) is modestly successful in
improving average welfare of all groups, policies (ii) and (iii) impose large welfare losses to high-wage
workers and are very costly in terms of aggregate income. In contrast, (iv) demonstrates that a (much) more
progressive tax system, with a reduction in the taxes levied on low-earners and balancing the budget by
increasing the taxes on high-earners, can achieve much of the redistribution gains, but without an output
decline, and with much smaller welfare losses for high income earners.
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Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper, while the different Appendices discuss various robustness checks,
both empirically and theoretically.
2. Employment and Occupation Trends
An important literature documents the changes in the task content of work, its relation to the decline in the
cost of industrial robotics, computing, and information technology, and its implications for the structure
of occupational employment and wages (see for example Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), Autor and Dorn (2013) and Atalay et al. (2018)). Relatedly, there is an emerging literature that
empirically asses the impact of automation on routine employment. For example, looking across countries,
Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2014) find that the greater the increase in ICT investment (at the industry-
country level) is, the greater the increase in the high-skilled labor share and the the decrease in the middle-
skill share of labor income is (with insignificant effects on the least-skilled group). Similarly, Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2019) consider variation across US commuting zones and find negative labor market effects given
industry specific robotic penetration. Finally, Gaggl and Wright (2017) and Tuzel and Zhang (2019) use tax
reforms in the U.K (the former) and the U.S. (the latter) that increase the incentives of ICT investment; both
papers find that the increase in ICT reduces the number of workers who perform R tasks while rewarding
workers engaged in non-routine, cognitive-intensive task
In this section we add to this literature by pursuing the following goal. We aim to document what has
happened to workers with "routine occupational characteristics" who would have been likely employed in
R occupations in the 1980s, a period we refer to as the "pre-polarization." Are they employed in other
occupations? Are they unemployed more frequently? Are they more likely to be out of the labor force?
Answering these questions is challenging as it involves a counterfactual experiment, where we must decide
which of the workers observed in the "post-polarization" period of the data, are those who would be R
workers if they were observed in the pre-polarization.
To do this, we consider an empirical framework that classifies individuals according to their likelihood of
employment in various occupational groups based on their observed characteristics during the late 1980s.
With this mapping between characteristics and specific occupations (e.g. R task-intensive ones), we then
track the actual employment and occupational choices of individuals with “routine occupational character-
istics” over time as automation advances.
Before proceeding, it is useful to compare this to alternative approaches using panel data following spe-
cific individuals.2 One could follow the evolution of the distribution of labor force and occupational choices
2Two candidate datasets are the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Panel Study if Income Dynamics
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of the 1980s cohort of routine workers. While this approach has natural appeal, it has two major disadvan-
tages. First, such an exercise only follows a single cohort (or small number of cohorts) of individuals, and
would be uninformative of the impact of automation on others cohorts, such as young workers entering the
labor market at the turn of the 21st century. Second, the long-run labor market transitions of individuals
over three decades confound macroeconomic effects with life-cycle effects—for example, the fact that indi-
viduals are more likely to get “promoted” to managerial occupations later in life, independent of advances
in automation.
Our approach circumvents these issues. We do not attempt to track individuals who worked in a routine
occupation over time. Instead, in each year we look for individuals with similar characteristics to those of
routine workers in the late 1980s. By identifying these “likely routine” workers, we can analyze the labor
market outcomes of the cross-section of such worker types over time, in a way that is not cohort-specific
and does not confound life-cycle effects.
2.1. Where do workers in declining occupations go? A machine learning approach
We classify prime-aged individuals (25-64 years of age) from the CPS into types based on the occupation
they would most likely have been employed in the pre-polarization era, before the rise of automation. To
obtain such a classification, we apply a random forest, machine learning (hereafter ML) algorithm using age,
education, gender, and race as observable characteristics in a flexible manner. Unlike previous work, such as
Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017), the ML approach uses this information in a flexible and agnostic manner,
that does not require us to pre-specify which characteristics, e.g. which age groups are "likely routine."
The occupational classification draws distinctions based on task intensity along two dimensions. The first
is whether an occupation is routine or non-routine. The second is based on whether it is “cognitive” versus
“manual” in task intensity. We thus end up with four categories of occupations: non-routine-cognitive
(NRC); routine-cognitive (RC); non-routine-manual (NRM); and routine-manual (RM). Our occupation
classification follows Jaimovich and Siu (2012); for more details about variable and sample definitions
see Appendix A.1.1.
We use cross-sectional data on employed individuals using their current occupation, and unemployed
individuals using their most recent occupation of employment. We do this during the pre-polarization period
(defined as 1984-1989) to train the ML algorithm to associate occupations to individual-level characteristics,
where we pick 1989 as the benchmark year for comparisons, since per capita routine employment peaked
(PSID); for example, Cortes (2016) uses the PSID to study short-run occupation switching dynamics through the lens of labor
market automation.
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that year (see for example Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017)). We then apply the algorithm to assign persons
to occupations in the remaining CPS subsamples. First, we use the predictions to assign the most likely
occupation to labor force non-participants during the pre-polarization period. Second, we roll the predictions
forward in time, 1990–2017, and predict occupations for all individuals. Doing so allows us to predict
participation and occupational choices for all individuals had there been no changes in the economy.
2.2. Results
While our ML approach classifies individuals into four occupational groups, we present results here aggre-
gating to two occupational types: NRC and non-NRC (i.e., RC, RM, and NRM). For the sake of exposi-
tion, we refer to these as high-skill and low-skill types, respectively.3 The ML algorithm suggests that the
strongest predictor for occupation choice in the late 1980s is a worker’s educational attainment.4
Table 1 summarizes our findings. Columns (1) and (2) display the of the fraction of workers in—or their
propensity to select into—labor force non-participation, unemployment, and employment in NRC, NRM
and R occupations for low-skill men. In the late-1980s, the fraction of low-skill types employed in routine
occupations was about 0.67; by 2017 this had dropped to approximately 0.57, a 10 percentage point (p.p.)
or 16 log point fall.
The decline in routine employment is necessarily accompanied by an offsetting increase in other labor
market statuses. Where did these low-skill type men end up in 2017? As indicated by Table 1, they did
not go into high-wage NRC occupations, as the propensity to work in NRC remained essentially constant at
zero.
By contrast, the probability of non-participation in the labor force (NLF) increased dramatically from
0.17 to 0.24, and the probability of employment in NRM occupations increased from about 0.11 to 0.15.
These two propensity changes account for the entire fall in R employment. Roughly two-thirds of the decline
3We choose this delineation for substantive reasons as well: predictive power is high and classification errors are small at this
level of aggregation, allowing for the minimization of noise in the type-specific series for employment and occupational choice
(see Appendix A.1.2 for further discussion). Moreover, as documented in Cortes (2016) and Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017),
large differences in characteristics exist between high- and low-skill worker types, whereas routine (cognitive and manual; simply
R hereafter) and NRM types are much more similar. This motivates previous theoretical analysis (such as the static, labor market
models of Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017)) as well as our modeling choice below.
4See Figure A1 in the Appendix, which displays a heat map of the probability of men in a specific education-age cell to be
classified as high-skill. Lower educated men (with high-school diplomas or less) are always classified as low-skill, while those
with more education (college graduates) are always classified as high-skill. For men with intermediate levels of education (some
post-secondary), there is a gradient by age: younger men tend to sort to non-NRC occupations, older men toward NRC. Race
(averaged within each cell) does not play an important role.
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Table 1: Labor market status and occupation composition changes for men, 1989-2017 by type
Low-skill High-Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1989 2017 1989 2017
Population Weight 0.65 0.52 0.35 0.48
Fraction in R 0.67 0.57 0.02 0.06
Fraction in NRM 0.11 0.15 ~0 0.01
Fraction in NRC 0.01 ~0 0.99 0.90
Fraction in NLF 0.17 0.24 ~0 0.03
Fraction in Unemployment 0.05 0.04 ~0 0.01
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.06 ~0 0.01
Notes: The first row of the table reports the share of the population in the non-NRC and NRC groups for men aged
25-64 in 1989 and 2017. Rows 2-6 report the fraction of men in 5 labor market states: Employed in routine occupation
(R); Employed in non-routine manual occupation (NRM); Employed in non-routine cognitive occupation (NRC); Not
in the labor force (NLF); and unemployed. The last row reports the unemployment rate. The categorization into non-
NRC and NRC groups was done using a random forest algorithm (see text for more details). CPS weights are applied
in all calculations.
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can be accounted for by the increase in NLF, and the rest by the increase in NRM employment. This is a
key result of our analysis: on average, low-skill types leaving R employment relocate into labor market
statuses that are associated with lower income.5 The bottom two rows of Table 1 indicate that the low-skill
experienced no obvious change in the unemployment rate, or in their unemployment-to-population ratio.6
Are these increases in NLF and NRM propensity unique to the low-skilled or are these an economy-
wide phenomena? Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 summarize the changes in labor force and occupational
employment statuses for high-skill men. This group has seen a decrease in NRC employment propensity
(see Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2018) for analysis of the divergent gender trends in the high-skilled labor
market.) But there is very little decline in labor force participation, no change in employment in NRM
occupations, and a slight increase in R employment (see Beaudry, Green and Sand (2016) for a model with
“crowding in” of high-skilled workers into middle-paying R occupations). This suggests that the changes
for the low-skilled are particularly linked to the decline of R occupations.
Women display similar patterns as those of men, but over a different time period. As is well known, the
1960-2000 period saw a pronounced increase in female labor force participation. But since the turn of the
twenty-first century, this has plateaued and begun to fall even among the prime-aged. As such, the period
since the turn of the century is more indicative of female occupational dynamics.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present the same information as in Table 1 but for low-skill women, 2001–
2017. There has been a pronounced fall in the likelihood of employment in R occupations, with no increase
in the propensity for NRC employment or unemployment.7 Instead, they have seen offsetting increases in
both the likelihood of non-participation and NRM employment; this split is again roughly two-thirds toward
NLF, one-third toward NRM. This is the same split observed for low-skill men over the the 1989–2017 time
period, and, as Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show, during 2001–2017 as well.
To summarize, the likelihood of working in R occupations has fallen for those individuals that were
likely to be routine workers. This has been offset by increased likelihood of non-participation and NRM
employment. In all cases considered, the offsetting labor market changes have been roughly split two-thirds
toward non-participation, one-third toward increased employment in low-wage, NRM occupations. We view
these “stylized facts” to be important to account for in our quantitative model analysis.
5Leaving the labor force is likely to be accompanied by increased dependency on transfer payments, while a transition to NRM
is likely to be accompanied by a fall in wages and earnings (see, for instance, Autor and Dorn (2013)).
6Moreover, using high frequency CPS data we find that within each occupation, both the unemployment rate and exit rates show
no low frequency trend over time. Unemployment exit rates were constructed from the outgoing rotation groups in the CPS and are
calculated for three type of workers - Routine (R), Non-Routing Manual (NRM) and Non-Routine Cognitive (NRC) based on their
last occupation prior to the unemployment spell.
7Though not displayed, these dynamics are not observed for high-skill women as neither they are in the case of high-skill men).
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Table 2: Labor market status and occupation composition changes for non-NRC types
female male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2001 2017 2001 2017
Population Weight 0.68 0.55 0.58 0.52
Fraction in R 0.39 0.30 0.64 0.57
Fraction in NRM 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.15
Fraction in NRC 0.07 0.06 0.01 ~0
Fraction in NLF 0.34 0.40 0.19 0.24
Fraction in Unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Unemployment rate 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Notes: The first row of the table reports the share of the population in the non-NRC and NRC groups for men aged
25-64 in 1989 and 2017. Rows 2-6 report the fraction of men in 5 labor market states: Employed in routine occupation
(R); Employed in non-routine manual occupation (NRM); Employed in non-routine cognitive occupation (NRC); Not
in the labor force (NLF); and unemployed. The last row reports the unemployment rate. The categorization into non-
NRC and NRC groups was done using a random forest algorithm (see text for more details). CPS weights are applied
in all calculations.
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2.3. Classifying Workers using Cognitive Ability Measures (AFTQ Scores)
A shortcoming of the ML approach is that it relies on workers’ observed educational attainment—a variable
that is potentially endogenous to the automation (and potentially other) forces under consideration. To
address this, we consider a robustness check using respondent’s AFQT score as measured in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY); the AFQT measure is arguably a more direct and exogenous proxy
of cognitive ability, determined pre-labor market measure of a worker’s type. For comparability of scores
between the 1979 and 1997 NLSY surveys, we use the standardized measure provided by Altonji, Bharadwaj
and Lange (2012). While the NLSY sample is too small to implement our ML approach, we use it to validate
the patterns observed in the CPS.
Our analysis begins with the NLSY79, where we divide the sample into terciles of cognitive ability using
the AFQT score and analyze the employment outcomes during 1989-1990. Given the discussion above
regarding trends in female participation, we focus our analysis on men. We drop the lowest decile of the
AFQT distribution from the analysis, because men in this decile have an extremely low employment rate
(below 60% around age 30).
Table 3 indicates that, conditional on employment, there are large differences in the propensity to work in
non-NRC occupation (i.e R or NRM occupations) across AFQT scores. In the first tercile, 82% of workers
were employed in a non-NRC occupation. While less formal, this simple approach classifies men with lower
cognitive ability as “low skill.”
Table 3: Share of 1979 NLSY men working in Routine or non-Routine Manual occupations in 1989-1990
AFQT Deciles
2-4 5-7 8-10
(1) (2) (3)
Average share in NRM or R (non-NRC) 0.82 0.68 0.47
Notes: The table uses NLSY 1979, to report the share of workers in NRM or R (non-NRC) occupations by deciles
of cognitive ability as measured by the AFQT score. For comparability of scores between the 1979 and 1997 NLSY
surveys, we use the standardized measure provided by Altonji, Bharadwaj and Lange (2012)
Next, we ask where such workers end up in the post-polarization era. Table 4 compares the labor mar-
ket status and occupational composition for the low-skilled between 1989-1990 (using the NLSY79) and
2012-2013 (using the NLSY97). The changes in participation and occupational choice for these men (of
approximately 30 years of age) are consistent with the pattern from the ML approach using the CPS (for all
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Table 4: Labor market status and occupation composition changes for low cognitive ability men
1989-1990 2012-2013
Fraction in R 0.600 0.502
Fraction in NRM 0.114 0.177
Fraction in NRC 0.157 0.134
Fraction in NLF 0.096 0.120
Fraction in Unemployment 0.033 0.060
Average age 29.35 29.69
Observations 437 553
Notes: The table uses NLSY 1979 and NLSY 1997, to report the fraction of workers in the second to fourth decile of
cognitive ability in 5 labor market states in 1989-1990 and then again in 2012-2013: Employed in routine occupation
(R); Employed in non-routine manual occupation (NRM); Employed in non-routine cognitive occupation (NRC); Not
in the labor force (NLF); and unemployed.
prime working ages). There is a large decline in the likelihood of R employment (again of 16% as in the
CPS analysis above), accompanied by increases in the likelihood of non-participation and NRM employ-
ment. The split between these two channels is roughly half-half. That there is greater movement into NRM
in the NLSY is not surprising; this sample of low-skill men is younger than the CPS sample, and therefore
displays greater labor force attachment.
To summarize, we view this exercise as complementary to the analysis of Section 2.2, indicating the
quantitative importance of considering both, selection into labor force participation and occupational choice.
3. Model
As discussed above, the fall in the likelihood of working in R, middle-class, occupations could be a result
of various factors besides the rise of automation. In order to quantify the role of automation in this fall, we
develop a quantitive general equilibrium model with participation and occupational choice. Our view is that
the empirical analysis in Section 2 suggests that any model that studies the positive and normative effects of
automation should incorporate these dimensions.
Motivated by the findings of Section 2.2 indicating a sharp distinction between NRC and non-NRC types,
our model has two types of agents. We refer to these as high-skill (NRC) and low-skill (non-NRC) agents for
simplicity. There are three distinct occupations: non-routine cognitive (NRC), routine (R), and non-routine
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manual (NRM).
The low-skilled are heterogeneous as each worker is endowed with two ability parameters (productivity
draws from a distribution)—one for occupation R and one for occupation NRM. Given their abilities in each
occupation, individuals decide whether to participate in the labor force or not, and conditional on participa-
tion, in which occupation to search for employment. The occupational labor markets for low-skill workers
are subject to a search and matching friction as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985).
Hence, the low-skill occupation and participation choices depend on job finding probabilities and the equi-
librium compensation in each job when employed. While Section 2.2 indicates no change in unemployment
across the pre- and post-polarization eras, we model this labor market state since incentive effects on job
search and vacancy creation come into consideration in the policy experiments we consider in Section 6.
Capital inputs in the forms of ICT capital and non-ICT capital are used in final production. Both capital
stocks are owned by perfectly competitive final good producers who make investment decisions. Hence, the
degree of automation in the form of ICT capital accumulation is endogenous (see Eden and Gaggl (2018)
who document the rise of ICT capital in the last four decades).
For tractability, we assume that the high-skilled workers are identical, work only in the NRC occupation,
and participate in a frictionless labor market. Moreover, again for tractability reasons, we assume that these
workers are “capitalists” and own all firm equity in the economy; low-skilled workers are excluded from
asset/credit markets and are “hand-to-mouth,” with current consumption equal to current income.8 This
assumption regarding asset ownership, while simplistic, has empirical traction. For example, the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) reports median household net worth by the educational level of household heads.
Over the period of 1989-2016, median net worth of college graduates are more than 12 times as large as high
school dropouts, and more than 4 times as large as high school graduates. Thus, highly educated individuals,
who are empirically NRC worker types (as documented in Section 2.1), own the vast majority of assets in
the U.S.
Finally, to allow for analysis of various government policies, we include the following taxes and transfers:
a proportional tax on firms’ profits, a proportional progressive tax on labor income, unemployment benefits,
transfers to labor force non-participants.
8Allowing all workers to hold assets introduces a number of technical complications. This includes the need to keep track of the
marginal owner in the firm’s discount factor, the inclusion of wealth in low-skill workers’ dynamic problems, and the need to track
the distribution of firm ownership/capital holdings.
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Before formal presentation of the model, it is useful to comment on its relation to existing work. The basic
production structure determining labor demand borrows from the static labor market models of Autor, Katz
and Kearney (2006) and Cortes, Jaimovich and Siu (2017). Our analysis is most closely related to Eden and
Gaggl (2018) and vom Lehn (2019), who incorporate this labor demand framework into a dynamic, general
equilibrium setting.
We build upon them taking key model elements but deviate in two important ways. First, Eden and
Gaggl (2018) and vom Lehn (2019) consider representative agent frameworks implying zero consumption
and income inequality, making welfare implications of redistributive policies impossible to analyze. We
consider a more empirically realistic distribution of income, with high-skilled individuals also being the
owners of capital and firms, while low-skilled individuals earn labor income and receive government trans-
fers. In addition, those papers do not model a labor force participation and unemployment margin. Labor
supply is inelastic and the choice is along the margin of which occupation to work in, not along the margin
of whether to work/seek work. By contrast, individuals in our model are not assumed to work, and may
find themselves employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. This is important for two reasons. First,
the empirical analysis above suggested that labor force participation is the key margin of employment ad-
justment for the routine type workers. Second, allowing for labor force participation and unemployment is
critical for the welfare analysis, if one is to consider the implications of policy changes, such as, in transfer
payments to labor force non-participants, unemployment insurance, or employment subsidies. Finally, in
our framework all government insurance and redistribution programs (e.g., unemployment insurance, and
recently discussed proposals for “universal basic income”) must be financed through progressive labor and
capital/profit taxation. This allows us to use the model as a laboratory for policy evaluation in Section 6.
3.1. Final Good Producers
Perfectly competitive, final good firms produce output (Y ) using five inputs: intermediate goods (or service
flows) produced using NRC, R, and NRM labor denoted YNRC, YR, and YNRM, respectively; and service flows
from ICT capital (XA) and non-ICT “physical capital” such as structures (K). The constant returns to scale
production function for the final good is:
Yt = K
γ
t
(
(1−η)
[
(1−α)Y ς1NRC,t +α
[
XνA +Y
ν
R,t
] ς1
ν
] ς2
ς1
+ηY ς2NRM,t
) 1−γ
ς2
(1)
where ν controls the elasticity of substitution between ICT capital and the R intermediate good, ς1 controls
the elasticity of substitution between the NRC intermediate good and the ICT-R composite, ς2 which controls
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the elasticity of substitution between NRM and the composite of the previously discussed factors, and γ , η
and α control the income shares to different factors of production.
Final good producers accumulate physical and ICT capital (which depreciate at rates δK and δA, re-
spectively) and purchase the three intermediate goods from competitive markets at prevailing prices.9 The
relative price of investment in non-ICT is denoted φK and the relative price of ICT capital is φA, where the
final good is the numeraire (PY = 1). Hence, denoting by the "prime notation" a next period’s variable, the
firm’s per-period profit is:
pi = Y −PRYR−PNRMYNRM−PNRCYNRC−φA
(
X ′A− (1−δA)XA
)−φK (K′− (1−δK)K)
with the prices of intermediate goods given by PR,PNRC,PNRM. The firm’s dynamic problem is:
V (K,XA,Λ) = max
K′,X ′A,YR,YNRM ,YNRC
{
(1−Tpi)pi+β
[
V
(
K′,X ′A,Λ
′)]}
where Tpi is a tax rate on firms’ profits, β is the discount factor, and Λ = {φK ,φA,Tpi ,PR,PNRM,PNRC} is
a vector that contains all the state variables that the representative firm takes as given, which are either
exogenously specified or determined in equilibrium. Moreover, since our analysis below is across steady
states we already impose the stochastic discount factor being equal to β .10
The firm accumulates physical and ICT capital in accordance with two standard Euler equations that
equalize marginal cost and future return:
φK = β
[
MPK′+(1−δK)φ ′K
]
(2)
φA = β
[
MPA′+(1−δA)φ ′A
]
(3)
where MPK and MPA denote the marginal products of the two types of capital. Because profits are taxed
net of investment costs, there are no equilibrium effects on optimal capital demand.11
9The model is isomorphic if we assume that the final good firm also rents the capital from intermediate capital services producers.
10In writing the firm’s problem this way we already impose consistency conditions such that the optimal choice is identical
across firms and therefore represents the aggregate. As we show below, prices of intermediate goods are determined by the optimal
demand and therefore by aggregate quantities of the intermediate goods.
11For a a similar approach see Abel (2007).
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3.2. Intermediate Goods Production
3.2.1. Routine Intermediate Good Producers
Intermediate good producers produce the routine intermediate good, YR and sell it to the final good firm. In
order to produce the routine intermediate good these producers recruit routine workers in a frictional labor
market. As we discuss below, each low-skill agent is endowed with a pair of idiosyncratic productivity
parameters, εR and εNRM, drawn from a joint distribution Γ(εR,εNRM); εR (εNRM) denotes the idiosyncratic
ability of the worker if employed in production of the R (NRM) intermediate good. We assume that the
labor markets for the low-skilled are frictional and fully segmented by good i and ability ε . That is, there is
full information about worker abilities allowing unemployed workers and vacancies to meet in occupation-
and-ability-specific matches.
Generally, this setup implies that within each occupation, wages are specific for each combination of
εR and εNRM. However, as discussed in Section (4), our quantitative analysis will focus on steady state
equilibrium, implying that there are no transitions across occupations (only between employment and un-
employment states within an occupation). Thus, in this case, the bargained wage of an individual, within
a given occupation, is not a function of her productivity in the other occupation. To avoid cluttered nota-
tion, we introduce the firm decision problem assuming steady state wages, thus using ωR,εR and ωR,εNRM to
represent wages paid for R workers with ability εR and for NRM workers with ability εNRM respectively.
Hence, hiring low-skill workers with idiosyncratic ability εR (if these individuals endogenously decide
to work in the R occupation in equilibrium) to produce routine intermediate goods requires a firm to post
vacancies, vεR , at flow cost of κεR per vacancy. A constant returns to scale matching function, M (vεR ,uεR),
determines the number of new matches given vacancies and the number of unemployed job searchers (uεR)
in this good-ability-specific market. As is standard in the literature, firms take the tightness ratio, θεR ≡ vεRuεR ,
and the vacancy filling probability q(θR,εR) as given.
A matched firm and worker (with ability εR) produce yεR = fRεR units of the R good, where fR is an
identical productivity parameter across all matches irrespective of εR. This intermediate good is sold to the
final good producer at the competitive price PR per unit. The firm pays a bargained wage ωR,εR to the worker.
Thus the flow profit from a match is PR fRεR−ωR,εR .
Let xεR denote the number of employed R workers with idiosyncratic productivity εR. To derive the
optimality condition for vacancy creation, we assume—for expositional clarity—that there exists a repre-
sentative good-ability-specific firm that chooses vεR to solve:
J (xεR ,Λ) = maxvεR
{
(1−Tpi) [xεR (PR fRεR−ωεR)−κεRvεR ]+β
[
J
(
x′εR ,Λ
′)]} ,
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subject to the law of motion:
x′εR = (1−δ )xεR + vεRq(θεR) .
Here δ is the exogenous match separation probability (that is common across good-ability-specific matches).
The first order condition implies the optimality condition for vacancy posting:12
κεR
q(θεR)
= β
[
PR fRεR−ωεR +(1−δ )
κεR
q
(
θ ′εR
)] .
As with the case of capital taxation, because firm profits are taxed net of vacancy costs, there are no equilib-
rium effects of profit taxation on low-skilled job creation.
The quantity of efficiency-weighted R labor input is then given by:
YR = fR(1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗R
∫ εNRM(εR)
−∞
ERεRεRΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR, (4)
where PopNRC denotes the population share of high-skilled workers, Γ′(εR,εNRM) denotes the density func-
tion associated with the distribution function, Γ, and ERεR =
xεR
(xεR+uεR)
denotes the employment rate (per
labor force participant) for a given ability level, εR (recall that xεR denotes the measure of individuals with
ability εR that are working while uεR denotes the measure of individuals with ability εR who are unemployed).
As we show in Section 4.2, the economy is characterized by an ability cutoff in the R and NRM occu-
pational abilities as well as a function that determines in which occupation a worker works conditional on
participating in the labor force. In Equation (4) the term ε∗R denotes the cutoff ability in R such that all those
with lesser ability do not work in R; the function εNRM(εR) denotes the cutoff in ability NRM for each εR
value such that below it, workers choose to work in R and not in NRM.
3.2.2. Non-Routine Manual Intermediate Good Producers
The labor market for the NRM occupation is identical in structure to the R occupation and obeys the same
optimality principles. We do not repeat the exposition for brevity, and simply present the vacancy posting
12The use of a representative firm is for convenience only. An identical optimal condition can be derived when assuming a
Bellman value for an open vacancy, a Bellman value for a filled job, and a zero profit condition:
VR,εR =−(1−Tpi )κR,εR +q
(
θR,εR
)
β
[
J′R,εR
]
= 0,
JR,εR = (1−Tpi )
[
fRεRPR−ωR,εR
]
+(1−δ )β [J′R,εR] .
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optimality condition:
κεNRM
q(θεNRM)
= β
[
PNRM fNRMεNRM−ωεNRM +(1−δ )
κεNRM
q
(
θ ′εNRM
)] .
In equilibrum, the quantity of efficiency-weighted NRM labor input is given by:
YNRM = fNRM(1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗NRM
∫ εR(εNRM)
−∞
ERεNRMεNRMΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεRdεNRM,
where ERεNRM =
xεNRM
(xεNRM+uεNRM)
.
3.2.3. Non-Routine Cognitive Intermediate Good Producers
Given our primary interest is in the low-skilled labor market, we assume for simplicity that the high-skilled
labor market has no matching frictions. High-skill workers make no occupational choice, work only in NRC
production, and are identical in ability (normalized to unity). The problem of the NRC intermediate good
producer is static:
max
xNRC
fNRCPNRCxNRC−ωNRCxNRC,
taking productivity, fNRC, and competitively determined prices, PNRC and ωNRC as given. This gives rise to
the simple marginal revenue product equals wage condition in equilibrium:
ωNRC = fNRCPNRC.
3.3. Workers
In this subsection, we describe the dynamic optimization problem of high-skill and low-skill workers. All
workers are infinitely-lived and discount the future at rate 0 < β < 1.
3.3.1. Non-Routine Cognitive Workers
The results of Section 2.1 indicate that the high-skilled experience experience very low unemployment
which has not changed over time. Given this, we abstract from search-and-matching frictions. Our ultimate
interest is in accounting for general equilibrium effects of various policy proposals, that must be financed
through (progressive) distortionary income taxation. Given this, we opt to capture these distortions in the
simplest way; specifically, we model a labor supply margin of hours worked choice by the high-skilled that
responds to variation in the distortionary tax rate.
Formally, an exogenously specified fraction of workers are high-skill (NRC) workers, who have pref-
erences over consumption, CNRC denoted by the utility U (CNRC), and derive disutility from hours spent
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working, LNRC denoted by G(LNRC).13 They earn ωNRC per hour worked and are taxed on labor income at
the rate TNRC. High-skill workers save in the form of an asset that represents claims to profits of intermediate
goods firms. Let BNRC denote the beginning of period value of such claims (the sum of dividends and resale
value) that are traded at price p. Then, NRC workers solve:
VNRC (BNRC,Λ) = max
CNRC,B′
{
U (CNRC)−G(LNRC)+β
[
VNRC
(
B′NRC,Λ
′)]}
s.t.: CNRC + pB′NRC = LNRCωNRC (1−TNRC)+ pBNRC
3.3.2. Routine and Non-Routine Manual Workers
Let (εR,εNRM) denote a worker’s (constant) idiosyncratic ability draw pair. Given these draws an unmatched
low-skill worker simultaneously chooses whether to participate in the labor market or not and, conditional
on participating, in which occupational labor market to search. Let Ve,εR,εNRM (Λ) denote the value of being
an employed R worker for a worker with the productivities (εR,εNRM); for simplicity we denote the chosen
occupation for such an individual by the first subscript of the two productivities draw. Then, similarly,
Vu,εR,εNRM (Λ) denotes the value of being an unemployed R worker for such an individual, Ve,εNRM ,εR (Λ) the
value of being an employed NRM worker for this individual, and Vu,εNRM ,εR (Λ) is the value of being an
unemployed NRM worker for this individual. Let the value of labor force non-participation be VεO (Λ),
where we remind the reader that Λ= {φK ,φA,Tpi ,PR,PNRM,PNRC}, denoting the collection of aggregate state
variables that workers take parametrically.
The value of being employed as an R worker is then given by:
Ve,εR,εNRM (Λ) =U (Ce,εR)+βδ
[
max
{
Vu,εR,εNRM
(
Λ′
)
,Vu,εNRM ,εR
(
Λ′
)
,VεO
(
Λ′
)}]
+
β (1−δ )[max{Ve,εR,εNRM (Λ′) ,Vu,εR,εNRM (Λ′) ,Vu,εNRM ,εR (Λ′) ,VεO (Λ′)}] .
Current period consumption, Ce,εR , must satisfy the budget constraint:
Ce,εR = ωεR (1−TεR) ,
where ωεR denotes the wage (low-skill workers supply one unit of labor inelastically when employed), and
TεR is the income tax rate.
Routine matches separate with exogenous probability δ . If the match separates, the worker chooses
whether to leave or remain in the labor force in the following period; in the latter case, the worker also
13For exposition clarity we assume separability in consumption and leisure as we assume this formulation in our quantitative
work.
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chooses whether to search for employment in the R or NRM occupation. If the match does not separate, the
worker has the choice of remaining matched in the following period, leaving to unemployment, or leaving
the labor force. Given our interest in steady state comparison, an employed worker will never switch from
employment in one other sector to another.
An unemployed worker searching for a match in the R occupation meets a vacancy with probabil-
ity µ (θεR). Upon meeting, the worker chooses whether to match and become employed, remain un-
matched/unemployed, or leave the labor force. The dynamic problem of an unemployed worker is:
Vu,εR,εNRM (Λ) =U (Cu,εR)+β (1−µ (θεR))
[
max
{
Vu,εR,εNRM
(
Λ′
)
,Vu,εNRM ,εR
(
Λ′
)
,VεO
(
Λ′
)}]
+
βµ (θεR)
[
max
{
Ve,εR,εNRM
(
Λ′
)
,Vu,εR,εNRM
(
Λ′
)
,Vu,εNRM ,εR
(
Λ′
)
,VεO
(
Λ′
)}]
,
subject to:
Cu,εR = bωεR ,
where b denotes the (net of tax) unemployment insurance replacement rate for a worker with R ability, εR.
The problem for workers who are employed in, or unemployed and choose to search in, the NRM occupation
is identical in structure to that just described, except with R-subscripts replaced by NRM-subscripts and vice
versa.
A worker who is out of the labor force chooses whether to remain a non-participant, or become unem-
ployed in either R or NRM. We assume that the transfer to labor force non-participants is constant and
independent of ability. Hence, the dynamic problem is:
VεO (Λ) = U (CO)+β
[
max
{
Vu,εR,εNRM
(
Λ′
)
,Vu,εNRM ,εR
(
Λ′
)
,VεO
(
Λ′
)}]
,
subject to:
CO = bo.
Here, bo denotes (net of tax) government transfers to non-participants. Although non-participants receive
the same income, they have different abilities, ε , and face differing likelihoods of labor force participation
following a change in the economy.
3.4. Wage Bargaining
A match between an intermediate good firm and a worker generates a positive surplus that must be split.
As is common in the literature, we assume the Nash bargaining solution to surplus division. We present the
Nash bargaining problem for an R match; the exposition for an NRM match is analogous.
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The surplus for a firm is the marginal value of employing an additional worker:
∂J (xεR ,Λ)
∂xεR
= (1−Tpi)( fRεRPR−ωεR)+(1−δ )β
[
∂J
(
x′εR ,Λ
′)
∂x′εR
]
.
The surplus for an employed worker with idiosyncratic ability εR is:
V˜εR (Λ) =Ve,εR,εNRM (Λ)− [max{Vu,εR,εNRM (Λ) ,Vu,εNRM ,εR (Λ) ,VεO (Λ)}] .
The worker’s outside option is the optimal choice across searching for a new match in either the R or NRM
occupation, or labor force non-participation.
Denoting the worker’s bargaining weight by τ and the firm’s by 1− τ , the wage for a worker employed
in R with ability εR is the solution to:
max
ωεR
[
V˜εR (Λ)
]τ[∂J (xεR ,Λ)
∂xεR
]1−τ
. (5)
In Section 4 we impose functional form assumptions that allow for an analytic solution for the resulting
wage function.
3.5. Government Budget Constraint
Total unemployment insurance transfers to low-skill workers searching for NRM employment is given by:
UINRM = (1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗NRM
∫ εR(εNRM)
−∞
URεNRM bωεNRMΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεRdεNRM,
where URεNRM = 1− ERεNRM = uεNRM(xεNRM+uεNRM ) is the unemployment rate at ability level εNRM. Similarly,
transfers to unemployed R workers is:
UIR = (1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗R
∫ εNRM(εR)
−∞
URεNRM bωεRΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR,
where URεR = 1−ERεR = uεR(xεR+uεR ) . Letting NLF denote the measure of low-skill workers outside the labor
force:
NLF =
∫ ε∗R
−∞
∫ ε∗NRM
−∞
Γ′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR,
total government transfers to this group is NLFbo.
Government revenues are derived from labor and profit taxation. Labor taxes collected from employed
NRM and R workers is given by:
RevNRM = (1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗NRM
∫ εR(εNRM)
−∞
ERεNRM TεNRMωεNRMΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεRdεNRM,
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and :
RevR = (1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗R
∫ εNRM(εR)
−∞
ERεRTεRωεRΓ
′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR,
respectively. Labor taxes collected from NRC workers is:
RevNRC = PopNRCLNRCωNRCTNRC.
Revenue from the tax on profits of intermediate producers in the NRM and R occupations is given by:
RevpiNRM =(Tpi)(1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗NRM
∫ εR(εNRM)
−∞
[xεNRM ( fεNRMεεNRM PNRM−ωεNRM)−κεNRM vεNRM ]Γ′(εR,εNRM)dεRdεNRM,
RevpiR = (Tpi)(1−PopNRC)
∫ ∞
ε∗R
∫ εNRM(εR)
−∞
[xεR ( fRεRPR−ωεR)−κεRvεR ]Γ′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR.
Tax revenue from the final good producer is given by:
Revpi = Tpi
[
Y −PRYR−PNRMYNRM−PNRCYNRC−φA
(
X ′A− (1−δA)XA
)−φK (K′− (1−δK)K)] .
The government does not borrow or save, so that at each point in time the following budget constraint
holds:
NLFbo+UINRM +UIR = RevNRC +RevR+RevNRM +Revpi +RevpiR +RevpiNRM . (6)
3.6. Equilibrium
To summarize the structure of the model, an exogenously specified fraction of workers are high-skilled.
They supply their labor in a frictionless labor market to the the NRC intermediate good and receive a market
wage equal to their marginal revenue product.
With respect to low-skilled individuals, each low-skill agent is endowed with a pair of idiosyncratic
productivity parameters, εR and εNRM, drawn from a joint distribution Γ(εR,εNRM). The labor markets for
the low-skilled are frictional and fully segmented by good i and ability εi, for i = {R,NRM}.
Unemployed low-skill workers choose whether to search in the R or NRM labor market or to leave
the labor force. Low-skill workers work for profit-maximizing intermediate producers. Producers decide
whether to maintain vacancies and, if so, in which good-and-ability specific market. Given equilibrium
prices, outside options, and government policies, intermediate good firms choose vacancies optimally. Free
entry implies zero lifetime profits.
Hence, formally, given productivities, {Z,φK ,φA fR, fNRM, fNRC}, the distribution of low-skill abilities,
Γ(εR,εNRM), and the population fraction of high-skill workers, PopNRC, a symmetric stationary equilibrium
with Nash bargaining is a collection of:
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• intermediate good prices, {PNRC,PR,PNRM}, and prices on equity claims {p};
• wages {ωNRC} and {ωεR ,ωεNRM} for all εR,εNRM;
• tightness ratios, {θεR ,θεNRM}, and vacancies, {vεR ,vεNRM}, for all εR,εNRM;
• worker quantities, {CNRC,LNRC,BNRC,Co} and {Ce,εR ,Cu,εR ,Ce,εNRM ,Cu,εNRM} for all εR,εNRM;
• labor input, xNRC and {xεR ,xεNRM} for all εR,εNRM;
• firm quantities, {Y,YNRC,YR,YNRM,K,XA}; and
• policy, {Tpi ,TNRC,b,bo} and {TεR ,TεNRM} for all εR,εNRM
such that
• final good and intermediate good firms are profit maximizing (and in particular, physical capital ac-
cumulation, automation capital accumulation, and vacancy creation is optimal),
• workers are utility maximizing (specifically, high-skill workers are making saving and labor supply
decisions, and low-skill workers are making participation and occupational choices optimally),
• R and NRM wages solve their respective Nash bargaining problems,
• the final good market clears:
Y = PopNRCCNRC +
(
1−PopNRC
)[∫ ∞
ε∗R
∫ εNRM(εR)
−∞
(
ERεRCe,εR +URεRCu,εR +κεRvεR
)
Γ′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR
+
∫ ∞
ε∗NRM
∫ εR(εNRM)
−∞
(
ERεNRMCe,εNRM +URεNRMCu,εNRM +κεNRM vεNRM
)
Γ′(εR,εNRM)dεRdεNRM
+
∫ ε∗R
−∞
∫ ε∗NRM
−∞
CoΓ′(εR,εNRM)dεNRMdεR
]
+φA
(
X ′A− (1−δA)XA
)
+φK
(
K′− (1−δK)K
)
• labor market of the three factors of production clears,
• the equity market clears: B = 1, and
• the government’s budget constraint is satisfied.
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4. Construction of Steady State Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the steady state equilibrium. We highlight a set of sufficient assumptions
that deliver, as in the data, unemployment rates that do not vary as ICT price fall. The three conditions are:
(i) a constant relative risk aversion (hereafter CRRA) function, U(.), (ii) vacancy costs, κεR ,κεNRM for all
εR,εNRM, that are proportional to productivity, and (iii) income for low-skill labor force participants that is
proportional to their wage (i.e., unemployment benefits specified as a replacement rate relative to the wage
when employed) as modelled above.
4.1. Wages and tightness ratios
Recall the bargaining problem characterizing the R occupation, equation (5). As we show in Appendix
A.2.1, the resulting wage for an R worker with ability εR is:
ωεR = fRεRPR−
1− τ
τ
U (Ce,εR)−U (Cu,εR)
U ′ (Ce,εR)(1−TεR)−U ′ (Cu,εR)b
+θεRκεR
This is an increasing function of the worker’s marginal revenue product, fRεRPR, as well as labor market
tightness, θεR , which reflects the outside option for the worker. Unlike the standard DMP model with risk
neutrality, the wage is also affected by the utility and marginal utility differences between employed and
unemployed workers.
With an eye toward quantitative analysis, we assume a CRRA utility function, U (C) = C
1−σ
1−σ . We show in
Appendix A.2.1 that the wage function simplifies to:
ωεR =
1
1+Ψ
[ fRεRPR+θR,εRκR,εR ] , (7)
where Ψ= (1−τ)τ(1−σ) . By following Pissarides (2000) and assuming that the hiring cost, κεR , is proportional to
the worker’s ability (reflecting the idea that it is more costly to hire more productive workers), i.e.,
κεR = fRPRεRκ0,
where κ0 > 0 is an exogenous parameter, it then follows that the wage function (7) is linear in worker ability,
εR. With these assumptions, we show in Appendix A.2.1 that the equilibrium tightness ratio implicitly
solves: [
1−β (1−δ )
q(θεR)
+β
θεR
1+Ψ
]
κ0 = β
Ψ
1+Ψ
, ∀εR. (8)
Hence, equilibrium tightness ratio is independent of productivities and capital prices, {φK ,φA, fR, fNRM, fNRC}.
The same is true of tightness in NRM as well. The model yields a constant tightness ratio for each occu-
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pation in steady state, even as productivity (i.e. automation technology) changes. This makes the model
consistent with the empirical patterns of the unemployment rate discussed in Section 2.
4.2. Productivity cutoffs
As indicated by (8), equilibrium tightness is also independent of worker ability. This is useful in estab-
lishing results regarding productivity cutoffs. In Appendix A.3 we show that the steady state values of
unemployment can be expressed as:
Vu,εR,εNRM =
( fR PRεR)1−σ
1−β kR(εR),
Vu,εNRM ,εR =
( fNRMPNRMεNRM)1−σ
1−β kNRM(εNRM),
for all εR,εNRM. Here, kR(εR) and kNRM(εNRM) are functions of exogenous parameters and occupation-and-
ability specific tightness ratios:
kR(εR) =
(
b 1+θεRκ01+Ψ
)1−σ
1−σ +
(
1+θεRκ0
1+Ψ
)−σ [
(1−TεR)1−σ −b1−σ
]
θεR
τ
1− τ κ0,
kNRM(εNRM) =
(
b 1+θεNRMκ01+Ψ
)1−σ
1−σ +
(
1+θεNRMκ0
1+Ψ
)−σ [
(1−TεNRM)1−σ −b1−σ
]
θεNRM
τ
1− τ κ0.
We have assumed that the unemployment insurance replacement rate, b, is constant across low-skill
worker abilities. Equation (8) indicates that labor market tightness ratios are constant across abilities: θεR =
θR, ∀εR, and θεNRM = θNRM, ∀εNRM. If we assume that low-skill tax rates are independent of ability, TεR =
TR, ∀εR, and TεNRM = TNRM, ∀εNRM, this implies that kR(εR) = kR and kNRM(εNRM) = kNRM are constant
across worker abilities.
This allows us to establish the following results. Recall that transfers to labor force non-participants
is independent of ability; hence the value of non-participation is independent of ability. Therefore, we can
solve for cutoff values ε∗R and ε∗NRM such that a worker with ability ε = (εR,εNRM) below both cutoffs prefers
labor force non-participation. These cutoffs are given by:
ε∗R =
1
fRPR
(
bo
kR
) 1
1−σ
,
ε∗NRM =
1
fNRMPNRM
(
bo
kNRM
) 1
1−σ
.
Those who draw ε above either cutoff (or both) choose to participate in the labor market. Which occu-
pation the worker searches in is determined by the values of unemployment, Vu,εR and Vu,εNRM . Specifically,
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for each εR(> ε∗R) there exists an εˆNRM such that for εNRM < εˆNRM, the worker chooses unemployment in R,
and for εNRM ≥ εˆNRM the worker searches in NRM. This cutoff is the solution to:
( fRPRεR)1−σ
1−β kR =
( fNRMPNRMεNRM)1−σ
1−β kNRM,
implying a linear function of the form:
εˆNRM(εR) =
(
kR
kNRM
) 1
1−σ fRPR
fNRMPNRM
εR.
This result is important from a computational perspective since it implies that the bounds of the various
integrals in the model are linear. That together with tightness ratios being constant implies that we can solve
for the equilibrium allocations and perform welfare calculations exploiting these closed form results, even
though the model features curvature in utility, production, and frictions in the labor market.
5. Quantitative Results
In this section we calibrate the model economy and evaluate the impact of advancement in automation
technology. We model this as a fall in the relative price of ICT capital, φA (or equivalently, an increase in
the productivity in transforming final goods into ICT capital, 1/φA). As a guide, we target pre-automation
moments, feed in the observed change in the price of automation, and evaluate model performance by
comparing 2017 predictions to observed US data.
5.1. Calibration
We begin this section by discussing the parametrization of the model. Table 5 lists the various parameters
and their values.
Ability distribution As is common in the literature we assume the work ability distribution, Γ(εR,εNRM),
to be jointly log normal. Hence, there are five parameters to specify: two standard deviations, two means,
and one correlation. Let σεR (µεR) be the standard deviation (mean) of the R ability, σNRM (µNRM) be the
standard deviation (mean) of the NRM ability, and ρεR,εNRM be the correlation between abilities. We note
that the model is “scale free”: the means of the distribution are irrelevant and we normalize them to unity.
The correlation between the two abilities cannot be identified in the data. As such, we solve the model for
various values of the correlation, ρεR,εNRM . Quantitatively, all of the results that we present here and in the
policy experiments (Section 6) are virtually identical for different values of ρ . As such we proceed with a
benchmark value of ρεR,εNRM = 0 and present robustness results in Appendix A.5
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Table 5: Calibration
Parameter Value Target
Ability Distribution
µNRM 1
NormalizationµR 1
σNRM 0.9803
Occupations allocations and variance of observed wagesσR 0.7436
ρR,NRM 0 See text for details
Preferences
β 0.9957 Monthly frequency; rannual = 0.05
σ 1 log utility
Labor Frisch Elasticity (NRC) 0.5 Chetty et al. (2013)
Labor Market Frictions
δ 0.02 Monthly exit rate 1989
elasticity of matches to v 0.5 Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
Taxes and Transfers
bNNRC 0.5 Maximum allowed, US 1989
bo .0813 Marginal worker indifferent between NLF and unemployment
TNRM 0.137
Average group tax ratesTR 0.137
TNRC 0.267
Depreciation Rates
δK 0.06
Annual depreciation rates (see Eden and Gaggl (2018))δA 0.19
Prices of Capital
φK 1
φA 0.77 Eden and Gaggl (2018)
φ2017A
φ1989A
0.3244 Fall in ICT prices 1989-2017 (see Eden and Gaggl (2018))
Production Function: Shares
η .1099 Labor share, Routine Labor Share, ICT capital In-
come share, 1989; and consistency restriction (see
Equation 9)
α 0.8154
fR 0.3022
τ 0.98
Production Function: Elasticities
γ 0.31 Physical capital income share (see Eden and Gaggl (2018))
ς2 0 ≈constant NRM income share
ν 0.46
Split of R workers between NLF and NRM and ∆ XAEMPRς1 -1.1
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We identify the standard deviations, σεR and σNRM, iteratively as follows. Given initial guesses for these
two parameters, we find the ability cutoffs, ε∗R and ε∗NRM, such that the model delivers the observed shares
of low-skill workers (as identified in Section 2) in the routine and non-routine manual occupations in 1989
(with the share in labor force non-participation simply the residual).
Then, given the linearity of the wage and integral bounds in ability, εR, discussed in Section 4, the log of
the routine wage can be written as:
logωεR = logD+ log(εR),
where D denotes a costant that is identical for all εR. This implies that the log wage is distributed:
logωεR ∼ N (µεR + logD,σR) ,
and thus, the variance of observed wages is given by:
Var(logωR,εR | logεR > logε∗R) = Var(logD+ logεR| logεR > logε∗R)
Given that D is a constant, this boils down to a variance in a truncated bivariate log normal:
Var(logεR| logεR > logε∗R) ,
with a similar expressions for the variance of observed NRM wages. We iterate on the guesses of the standard
deviations until the resulting truncated wages in the model match those in the data (the standard devaition of
the log observed wages for Routine workers in the data in 1989 is 0.487, while that for NRM equals 0.492).
Preferences The model is calibrated to a monthly frequency. We set β = 0.9957, targeting an average
annual risk free interest rate of 5%. We set σ = 1 so that preferences are logarithmic in consumption. Finally,
recall that NRC/high-skill workers supply labor along the intensive margin. Their separable preferences over
hours worked feature a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.5 (see Chetty et al. (2013)).
Frictional labor market parameters We set the exogenous monthly separation rate, δ , equal to the 1989
rate of 0.02; this is the monthly transition rate from employment to unemployment in the CPS for workers
whose last occupation was R or NRM. We assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function in each occupation-
ability-specific market, with symmetric elasticity with respect to vacancies and unemployed, equal to 0.5
(e.g., Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)). Without loss of generality, we assume an identical matching ef-
ficiency across all markets equal to 1. We calibrate the vacancy cost parameter, κ0 such that the resulting
employment rate across the low-skill workers matches the evidence in Table 1 of 0.95; this implies a monthly
job finding rate of 0.38 in all markets in the steady state.
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Government transfers There are two types of transfers in the model to low-skill workers: unemployment
insurance, specified as a replacement rate of occupation-and-ability specific earnings, and transfers to labor
force non-participants. We set the replacement rate for all workers types to 0.5 which is the maximum
allowed value in the U.S. The transfer to non-participants is set internally to ensure that, when calibrated
to match the 1989 shares of workers in R, NRM, and NLF, the marginal (ε∗R,ε∗NRM) worker is indifferent
between participating in the labor force and being unemployed.14
Taxes Government transfers are funded by taxes on profit and labor income. The labor tax schedule is
progressive. We set the tax on unemployment and non-participant transfer income to zero. The tax rate
on NRM and R labor income is set at TR = TNRM = 0.137, approximately the average tax rate across the
second to fourth quintiles of income, while for high-skill/NRC tax rate is set at TNRC = 0.267 which is the
average federal tax rate for the fifth quintile of income. These tax rates are based on the estimates in the
Congressional Budget Office distribution of household income in 2015.
At each calculation of a steady state equilibrium (before and after the decline in ICT price) we allow the
profit tax rate,Tpi , to adjust such that it balances the government budget constraint.15
Depreciation rates We use the specific capital depreciation rates estimated by Eden and Gaggl (2018) and
target an annual depreciation rate of δA = 19% for ICT capital, and δK = 6% on non-ICT, “physical” capital.
Relative prices of capital We use the same data to calibrate the initial relative price of ICT capital to
consumption to equal φ 1989A = 0.77. Our measure of advancement in automation technology is the fall in the
relative price of ICT capital between 1989 and 2017. Based on the estimate in Eden and Gaggl (2018) we
feed in a fall in the ICT price such that φ 2017A = 0.3244φ
1989
A .
16 We set the relative price of physical capital
to φK = 1.
Production and income share parameters We have assumed that aggregate production is Cobb-Douglas
with respect to non-ICT capital, K; its share parameter is calibrated directly from the Eden and Gaggl
14To put this into context, the resulting value of steady state consumption of the least able worker is equal to 0.37 of the average
R wage.
15Since investment is fully deducted in the model, this change has no effect on the economy. For all policy experiments in Section
6 we keep this tax rate constant and balance the budget with distortionary labor taxation on the NRC group.
16We note that the estimates in Eden and Gaggl (2018) end in 2013. We extrapolate both the price series and capital series until
2017 based on the median growth rate in these two series in the post Great Recession period. As a robustness check we note that dur-
ing period they overlap the relative chained price index of private fixed investment in information processing equipment and software
behave in an almost identical way to the Eden and Gaggl (2018) series. See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/B679RG3Q086SBEA.
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(2018) income share data to γ = 0.31. As we discuss below, the NRM labor share of national income
has not changed during our period of interest. As such, we set ς2 = 0 so that NRM input, YNRM, is also
Cobb-Douglas in production.
The parameters η ,α, fR, fNRM,τ also determine various income shares. We normalize fNRM = 1. The data
moments we match to identify the remaining four parameters are the shares of total labor income, Routine
labor income, ICT capital income in GDP, and the fact that, when calibrated to 1989, pre-polarization values,
the ratio of ability cutoffs must satisfy:
ε∗NRM
ε∗R
=
PR fR
PNRM fNRM
(
kR
kNRM
) 1
1−σ
, (9)
in steady state equilibrium.17
Production function: elasticities The remaining two parameters cannot be identified from first moments
in the data: ν , which controls the elasticity of substitution between ICT capital and R labor services, and ς1,
which controls the elasticity of substitution between YNRC and the (XA,YR) composite.
To calibrate them, we feed in the observed ICT price fall and iterate over ν and ς1 such that we match
two moments: (i) our Section 2 result of the 0.63/0.37 split between NLF and NRM in accounting for the
fall in R employment propensity among the low-skilled, and (ii) the observed change in the ratio of ICT
capital per employed R worker between 1989 and 2017 of 7.14 (i.e an increase of over 600%). We find that
the model matches these at values of ν = 0.46 and ς1 =−1.1. Importantly, we do not target the overall total
decline in routine employment when calibrating these parameters.
5.2. Model Results
In this subsection, we first present results on empirical moments that are not targeted in our model calibration
and quantitative specification. We conclude with results on the model’s welfare implications of advancement
in automation technology, as captured by the fall in the relative price of ICT capital.
5.2.1. Quantities and prices
To evaluate the empirical relevance of the model, and the role of ICT price change as a driving force in
automation, we consider several non-targeted moments, specifically: (i) the magnitude of the fall in R
employment propensity among the low-skilled, (ii) the change in the labor share of national income and its
17This is akin to an RBC model where the disutility scaling parameter on labor supply is calibrated to match a given fraction of
time spent in market activity in steady state.
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occupational composition, (iii) the behavior of the average NRM-to-R wage ratio, and (iv) the elasticity of
ICT capital to its price. Table 6 compares these non-targeted moments in the model to their values in the
data.
Likelihood of working in Routine With respect to the fall in the propensity of low-skill workers to work
in Routine occupations, the model generates a fall of 7.85 percentage points (p.p.). As discussed in Section
2, Tables 1 - 2 suggest that unconditionally, the fall in the likelihood was 16 p.p. between 1989 and 2017.
Thus, the model, when driven by the ICT price change, accounts for about half of this fall.
National Income Shares Between 1989 and 2017, the share of GDP accruing as labor income fell by
4.3 p.p. (see, for example, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)). The model, driven solely by the fall in the
price of ICT capital, generates a fall of 2.44 p.p., slightly more than half of that observed in the data.
With respect to the composition of labor income, Eden and Gaggl (2018) show that changes were not
evenly distributed across occupations. The routine occupational labor share of GDP fell dramatically by
9.51 p.p. between 1989 and 2017, more than twice that of aggregate labor’s share. At the same time,
the non-routine cognitive labor share rose by 4.17 p.p.; the share of GDP accruing to non-routine manual
employment remained roughly constant, increasing by 0.67 p.p..
As in the data, the fall in the share of GDP accruing to routine occupational workers in the model (5.9 p.p.)
is more than double the fall in aggregate labor (2.44 p.p.). Hence, the model accounts for roughly one-half
to two-thirds of fall in aggregate and routine labor income share. Moreover, the model yields an increase in
the share of income accruing to NRC labor of 3.5 p.p., very close to the change observed in the data.18
Relative wages One of the stylized facts associated with job polarization is the decline in the wage gap
between middle-class routine jobs and low-wage non-routine manual jobs. Based on CPS outgoing rotation
group data, the relative average hourly wage of R to NRM workers fell by about 10 percent during our period
of interest.19
To determine the model’s prediction for relative wages, we first note that the the model generates a fall of
7.4% in the wage per efficiency unit of routine labor, ωR, and an increase of 4.2% in the wage per efficiency
units of NRM labor, ωNRM. These efficiency measures, of course, are not the empirically observed measures.
As such, using the equilibrium efficiency wages, cutoffs, and employment rates, we construct the average
18Recall that the model is calibrated so that the NRM labor share of national income does not change.
19A similar fall, of approximately 12 percent, is observed in average hourly wages constructed from the March annual earning
supplement of the CPS. We are grateful to Paul Gaggl for sharing this data with us.
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Table 6: The Effect of ICT Price Decline
Data Model
Employment
% change in routine share (out of N-NRC) -16 -7.85
Income Shares (% of GDP)
p.p. change: Total -4.30 -2.39
p.p. change: Routine -9.51 -6.00
p.p. change: Non-Routine Cognitive 4.17 3.50
p.p. change: Non-Routine Manual 0.67 0.00
Wages
% change in avg. wage gap: Routine/Non-Routine-Manual -10.00 -3.60
GDP
% change in real per-capita GDP 40 11
Elasticity of ICT capital w.r.t. ICT price 0.40 0.41
Notes: All changes are between 1989 and 2017; see Eden and Gaggl (2018) for income shares by occupation.
wages (conditional on working in the economy), E(ωR), and E(ωNRM). As Table 6 indicates, the average R
to NRM wage ratio falls by 3.6%, accounting for about a third of the observed change in the data.
Elasticity of ICT Capital to its Price Finally, we note also that the model matches the elasticity of ICT
capital to its price, 0.40 as measured form the ICT capital stock and relative price data in Eden and Gaggl
(2018). This, too, is not targeted in the model calibration.
5.2.2. Output and Welfare
Output What are the model’s implications with respect to aggregate output? The fall in ICT price and the
resulting equilibrium allocations increase GDP by 12%. By way of comparison, between 1989 and 2017,
output per capita has risen by about 40% in the data. Hence, the model implies that about a quarter of the
change in observed output can be attributed to advancement in automation technology, as proxied by the
drop in the relative price of ICT capital.
Measures of welfare What does automation and the increase in aggregate output mean for welfare? We
show that, despite rich model heterogeneity, our assumptions allow us to derive simple closed form solu-
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tions that characterize welfare. We then use these welfare measures to outline the heterogeneous welfare
implications of advances in automation technology.
Recall that the steady state value of being unemployed, with ability εR, and searching for employment in
the R occupational market is given by:
Vu,εR,εNRM =
( fRPRεR)1−σ
1−β kR.
The steady state value of being employed is given by:
Ve,εR,εNRM =
 (1−β (1−µ(θεR )))1−β kR− b1−σ1−σ
βµ(θε,R)
( fRPRεR)1−σ .
Hence, the expected or average welfare of a labor force participant, with ability εR, who selects into the R
occupation is a weighted average, with weights given by the unemployment and employment rates:
VεR,εNRM =URεRVu,εR,εNRM +ERεRVe,εR,εNRM .
Substituting in from above, the consumption equivalent value of utility is naturally given by:
CεR =
URεR kR1−β +ERεR
 (1−β (1−µ(θεR )))1−β kR− b1−σ1−σ
βµ(θεR)

1
1−σ
fRPRεR.
A similar expression holds for labor force participants in the NRM occupation. This greatly simplifies the
calculation of welfare and how they change across steady states.
We proceed as follows. Given the post-automation equilibrium cutoffs for ε∗,NEWR and ε
∗,NEW
NRM , we sim-
ulate a billion low-skill individuals, drawing abilities from the calibrated joint log normal distribution. We
then calculate the new steady state measures of NLF, R, and NRM as:
NLFNEW = I
(
εR ≤ ε∗,NEWR
)
I
(
εNRM ≤ ε∗,NEWNRM
)
NRMNEW = I (log(mnew)+ log(εR)≤ log(ε2)) I
(
ε∗,NEWNRM ≤ εNRM
)
RNEW = I (log(mnew)+ log(εR)> log(ε2)) I
(
ε∗,NEWR ≤ εR
)
where I(.) is an indicator function and mnew = ε
∗,NEW
NR
ε∗,NEWR
. We identify those low-skill individuals who choose to
remain in their original occupation, and those who switch occupations or leave the labor force. In particular,
following the ICT price change, the switchers are: (i) those used to be R and become NLF, (ii) those who
used to be R and become NRM, and (iii) those who used to be NLF and become NRM. We calculate the
percent change in consumption equivalent welfare due to automation for each group separately.
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Previously routine workers Consider those who choose the routine occupational market both pre- and
post-automation. Their ratio of post- to pre-automation welfare, denoted by ∆ROLD→ RNEW , is given by:
∆ROLD→ RNEW =
[
URεR
kR
1−β +ERεR
[
(1−β (1−µ(θεR )))
1−β kR− b
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θεR )
]] 1
1−σ
fRPNEWR E (εR)
ROLD→RNEW
[
URεR
kR
1−β +ERεR
[
(1−β (1−µ(θεR )))
1−β kR− b
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θεR )
]] 1
1−σ
fRPOLDR E (εR)
ROLD→RNEW
=
PNEWR
POLDR
,
where E(εR)R
OLD→RNEW denotes the average ability of those who remain in R. From equation (8), recall that
labor market tightness, employment/unemployment rates, and kR are invariant to changes in φA. Hence,
the change in welfare is exactly the change in prices that final goods producers pay for routine labor input;
these prices are translated 1-to-1 to routine worker wages, their consumption, and (consumption equivalent)
welfare. As indicated in the bottom panel of Column 1, Table 7, those who remain in R experience a 6.5%
drop in welfare.
Welfare change derivations for those who switch occupations or labor force status are slightly more
involved; details are provided in Appendix A.4. All results are displayed in the bottom panel of Column 1,
Table 7.
Some R workers have relatively high NRM abilities; post-automation, they switch into NRM (as opposed
to remaining R or leaving the labor force). These workers see an average fall in welfare as well (though
smaller than those who remain R), amounting to 1% in consumption equivalent terms. Others who were
previously R have relatively low NRM ability. After the fall in the return to R employment, they choose to
exit the labor force. This group experiences an average welfare fall of 4%.
All other workers Since NRM labor input is complementary to automation capital, the return to working
(and searching) in that occupation rises. In the new steady state, all those who were previously in NRM
choose to remain. Welfare increases by 5% for the average NRM stayer.
For most low-skill individuals who were out of the labor force, the fall in ICT capital price does not
affect their participation choice. Since government transfers, bo, are unchanged, their welfare is unchanged.
However, those with sufficiently high NRM ability respond to the increase in the return to NRM labor, and
switch to participating in the NRM occupational market. This group sees an average welfare increase of
3.2%.
Finally, high-skill workers benefit the most from the decline in the price of automation technology, expe-
riencing a consumption equivalent welfare increase of 22%. This is not surprising since NRC labor input is
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a complement with ICT capital in production, and because they are the “capitalists” and hold all firm equity
in the economy.
6. Policy Experiments
Given that we find an important quantitative role for automation, we use this new framework as a laboratory
to consider a variety of government policies and their consequences for equilibrium allocations and welfare.
We consider two sets of policies. First, we study the effects of a retraining program, targeted at improving the
work ability (in a distributional sense) of the low-skilled. Second, we consider a broader set of redistribution
policies that target transfers to the low-skilled. A number of these—such as reforms to the unemployment
insurance system and the introduction of a universal basic income—have been discussed in the context of
ameliorating inequality, and aiding those most negatively affected by automation.
Before proceeding, we note that it is possible to completely undo all of the equilibrium effects of the fall
in φA, through the introduction of a tax on purchases of ICT capital, τA. Increasing τA to exactly offset the
fall in φA, leaving the effective ICT price unchanged, would return the economy to its pre-automation steady
state values.
6.1. Retraining program
Our first policy experiment changes the ability distribution of low-skill workers in the face of automation.
We consider a change in the marginal distribution of εNRM ability (leaving the marginal distribution of
εR unchanged), capturing the idea of training low-skill workers to do non-routine manual work.20 In this
retraining policy, we target those who are out of the labor force (i.e. have ability below both cutoffs ε∗,NEWR
and ε∗,NEWNRM ) in the 2017, post-automation steady state.
21
Starting from the post-automation steady state (described in Column 1 of Table 7), we “offer” an additive
increase in NRM ability to non-participants. For those with relatively high εNRM, the increase would improve
their ability sufficiently to induce them to join the labor force and seek employment in the NRM occupation;
20The closest existing federal program would be the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program assisting workers in firms
hurt by foreign trade. Among other benefits, this program pays for retraining. See for example the 2015 TAA benefits page:
https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/benefits/2015-amendment-benefits.cfm
21We view this as an empirically relevant exercise based on Card, Kluve and Weber (2018) who conduct a meta analysis of
training programs, and find that training programs generally affect employment over longer horizons, with larger effect for the
long-term unemployed (see, for example, Tables 3 and 9). These latter individuals are the most similar to the targeted individuals
in our model analysis.
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Table 7: Policy Experiments
ICT Retraining UI UBI NLF Taxation
Change Benefits
Cutoffs
1) ∆ε∗R 6.70 -0.22 -3.95 10.77 26.37 -9.66
2) ∆ε∗NRM -4.84 4.00 -4.51 9.45 26.66 -10.24
Labor states
3) Φ NLF 2.19 -2.21 -2.20 5.84 15.12 -5.18
4) Φ R -3.82 0.27 1.57 -4.69 -11.52 3.81
5) Φ NRM 1.64 1.94 0.64 -1.15 -3.60 1.37
6) Emp. Rate R 0.95 0.95 0.945 0.946 0.95 0.95
7) Emp. Rate NRM 0.95 0.95 0.945 0.946 0.95 0.95
8) ∆YNRC 1.23 0.37 0.13 -13.87 -8.03 -2.06
9) ∆YR -3.72 0.60 -0.11 -5.03 -12.37 3.13
10) ∆YNRM 7.14 5.02 -0.75 -4.01 -13.18 3.90
11) ∆ GDP 11.98 1.02 -0.06 -10.42 -10.04 0.29
12) Φ NRC labor tax 0.00 -1.51 -0.50 35.19 25.00 9.98
Wages
13) ∆ωR -6.70 0.22 0.14 -7.22 3.42 -4.19
14) ∆ωNRM 4.84 -4.00 0.70 -5.90 3.14 -3.61
15) ∆ωNRC 23.24 0.83 -0.30 7.50 -3.79 4.45
16) ∆ωNRC : after tax 23.24 0.85 0.11 -12.80 -10.64 -2.82
Welfare: Consumption Equivalence
17) ∆ : ROld → ∆RNew -6.48 1.23 1.75 6.23 3.48 10.13
18) ∆ : ROld → ∆NRMNew -0.95 NA 2.56 11.69 NA 10.45
19) ∆ : ROld → ∆NLFNew -4.01 NA NA 26.25 16.69 NA
20) ∆ : NRMOld → ∆RNew NA -1.17 NA NA 3.33 NA
21) ∆ : NRMOld → ∆NRMNew 4.96 -3.25 2.43 7.43 3.18 10.78
22) ∆ : NRMOld → ∆NLFNew NA -1.99 NA 27.12 16.64 NA
23) ∆ : NLFOld → ∆RNew NA 0.00 2.24 NA NA 5.79
24) ∆ : NLFOld → ∆NRMNew 3.17 9.23 2.51 NA NA 6.09
25) ∆ : NLFOld → ∆NLFNew 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.05 34.71 0.00
26) ∆ : NRCOld → ∆NRCNew 22.64 1.98 0.07 -21.89 -22.99 -4.98
Notes: (i) Φ denotes percentage point change; (ii) ∆ denotes percentage change; (iii) the reference point for the first
column is the steady state beofre the ICT price decline; (iv) the reference point for columns 2-6 is the steady state after
the ICT price decline.
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such workers would optimally select into the “retraining” treatment. Others with low εNRM would not.
We search for the NRM ability increase that returns low-skilled labor force participation to its 1989, pre-
automation value. We find that in order to return labor force participation back to its pre-automation level,
an increase in εNRM that equals about a quarter of the standard deviation of NRM ability is required. This
induces about 10% of non-participants to select into treatment.22
This experiment increases GDP by slightly more than 1%, through two effects. First, since both labor
force participation and NRM ability increase (for those who transition from outside the labor force into NRM
occupations), there is a direct effect on labor input and, hence, output. Second, given the complementarity
of NRM labor with ICT capital, it increases the return to investment, leading to an increase in the both types
of capital stock, further contributing to output growth.
In terms of welfare, the main beneficiaries are naturally non-participants who, through retraining, move
into the NRM occupation. They experience an increase in consumption equivalent welfare of just over 9%.
The second group to most benefit is the high-skilled, who experience a 2% increase in welfare. This is due
to two channels. First, transfers to labor force non-participants are reduced, reducing their labor tax rate
by about 1.5 p.p.. Second, the NRC wage increasing by almost 1 percent since they are complements in
production to both NRM labor and automation capital.
With respect to the low-skill, those who were already working in NRM prior to the experiment see a fall
in welfare. This is due to a displacement effect: the increase in the supply of NRM abilities leads to a fall in
the efficiency price of their labor. This leads to an exit from the labor force of workers with NRM abilities
that were close to the pre-retraining threshold.23 Still others are induced to switch to the R occupation. The
most negatively affected are those with sufficiently high εNRM that remain in the occupation, and suffer from
the fall in their wages, income, and welfare. Finally those who were working in R prior to retraining observe
a small increase in welfare, since their labor is complementary to NRM labor.
Cost-benefit analysis Since the existing literature provides little guidance regarding the appropriate “pro-
duction function” (and hence cost structure) of retraining programs, our analysis abstracts from the policy
experiment’s cost. Yet, it is instructive to provide a proxy in terms of cost-benefit analysis.
22Since the experiment results in an ability distribution that is no longer log normal, we cannot rely on closed form solutions of
the bivariate log-normal distribution. Rather we rely on numerical simulation of one billion individuals and calculate the resulting
equilibrium.
23Note that this experiment treated roughly ten percent of the NLF, which is about 3 percent of the population. Yet NLF went
down by only 2.2 percentage points. Thus, there is an inflow into the NLF from the NRM due to the displacement effect of about
0.8 percentage points.
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This retraining induced an inflow from outside the labor force of approximately 10% (i.e. about 3% of
the population), resulting in an increase of output of about 1%. This means that as long as the various per
participant cost channels of the program (i.e. labor, capital and potential increases in tax distortions) amount
to less than about a third of per capita GDP, the retraining program has a positive return from an aggregate
perspective.
6.2. Redistributive transfers
In this subsection we consider four redistributive policies transferring resources from high-wage workers
(who, as shown in Section 5, significantly benefit from automation) to middle- and low-wage workers. The
four policies are: (i) a reform to the unemployment insurance system (UI), (ii) the introduction of a universal
basic income (UBI), (iii) increasing transfers to those outside of the labor force, and (iv) changes in the labor
taxes levied on the low-skilled.
Given the general equilibrium emphasis of the model, each of these policies must be financed through
increased government taxation. Our approach is to do so through increased labor income taxes of high-
skill (NRC) workers, those who have most benefited from automation. This is to be consistent with our
interest in analyzing the effects of programs targeted toward those most adversely affected, in the model, by
automation. This implies increasing the distortion on labor supply of high-skill workers.
6.2.1. Unemployment Insurance Benefits
We begin with a change to the UI, where workers receive an additional transfer while unemployed. We
choose the size of this transfer so that, as in the retraining program discussed in Section 6.1, the low-skilled
labor force participation rate returns to its 1989, pre-automation level. For comparability, we keep the “dollar
value” of transfers per recipient fixed across the four redistributive experiments.24
Specifically, we consider an increase in the generosity of UI benefits whereby an additional transfer, UI >
0, is provided to each unemployed worker. This is in addition to the existing unemployment benefit modelled
as a replacement rate relative to the worker type’s wage. As an example, consumption of an unemployed
routine worker of type εR becomes Cu,εR = bωεR +UI. This additive term in the budget constraint (present
also in the UBI analysis below) means that the linearity of the solution approach discussed in Section 4
is no longer applicable. As a result: (i) each labor market (segmented by εR and εNRM for R and NRM
occupations, respectively) features a different tightness ratio, and (ii) the equilibrium cutoffs are no longer
24The qualitative effects across programs remains the same irrespective of the specific value we consider.
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linear functions of ability. Solving for the equilibrium requires additional numerical computation (e.g.,
numerical integration, spline approximation).25
An Illustrative Simplified Model What is the effect of the increase in unemployment benefits on the
economy? Before discussing the effects within the context of our GE model, we find it useful to discuss
the effects of such a policy changes within a simplified search and matching model with CRRA preferences
but (i) without heterogeneity in production, (ii) no taxes, and (iii) no curvature in production (i.e a constant
productivity in production). Specifically, we consider an individual who prior to any UI policy change is
indifferent between being unemployed or being outside of the labor force (i.e. the individual with εR = ε∗R).
This simplified model will help us emphasize the role of search frictions in driving the effect of the policy
change on wages, unemployment and the labor participation decision. Figure 1 depicts the key outcomes of
this simplified model.
Given concavity in preferences, a more generous UI system reduces the difference in utility between
being employed and unemployed (see bottom left panel of Figure 1), a key object in the Nash bargaining
problem. As a result, the bargained wage increases as the top left panel depicts.26 Since the worker’s
productivity does not change, this increase in the wage must result, via the free entry condition, in a fall in
vacancy creation, and in the tightness ratio, which manifests itself in a fall in the job finding rate in the top
right panel. Taken together, as the lower right panel depicts, the value of unemployment increase vs. the
value of non-participation (which is not affected by change in the UI system). Hence, a more generous UI
system leads to an increase in the value of participating in the labor force.
The Full GE model What are the effects in our full GE model? The third column in Table 7 reports the
results of a more generous UI system within our full model economy.
First, as discussed above, the increase in UI benefits increases the value of being unemployed, while the
value of being outside the labor force is not affected. This leads to an increase in the value of participating
in the labor force as can be seen in the third row.27
While labor force participation increases, as in the simplified model above, the increase in UI benefits
affects the wage and job finding rates. Hence, in the context of this UI experiment, quantitatively, a key
channel through which these policies operate is via the bargaining problem and its impact on the wage
25Additional details are available upon request.
26The effect discussed here will also naturally be present in models with linear utility.
27Quantitatively, we look for the value of the UI transfer that leads the labor force participation of the low-skilled to return to its
1989 allocation. We find this value to be 25.7 percent of the average UI transfers in the economy. This value, which will also be
used in the rest of the transfer experiments below, is equivalent to about 420 dollars per month in 2017.
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Figure 1: UI policy
Notes: The x-axis depicts different UI transfers; a value of 0.3 matches the ratio of the UI transfer to the wage of the
marginal Routine worker in our economy prior to the introduction of the program. Each line in the four different
panels shows the response to changes in UI in a simple version of the model with no heterogeneity in production, no
taxes, and no curvature in production. The % deviation in wages in the top-left panels are vis-a-vis the wage prior to
the introduction of the increased UI benefits.
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Figure 2: UI policy: Effects on the relative wage and job finding rates
Notes: The x-axis for both panels is log(εR). The support includes productivity to the right of the ε∗R cutoff
and vacancies posting by firms. To discipline our analysis we require the model to match the elasticity of
unemployment duration to unemployment benefits (see Appendix A.6 for a discussion).
Figure 2 depicts the heterogeneous equilibrium effects on the wage and on the job finding rate of the
more generous UI policy in our full GE model. The left panel displays the ratio of the new post-policy
wage to the pre-policy (and post-automation) wage, for each routine ability level, εR. As discussed above
in the simplified version of the economy, the increase in the UI transfer leads to an increase in the wage.
Figure 2 suggests that the wage increases at each ability (ranging from approximately 0.3% to 1.2%), though
proportionately more at low ability levels as the additional transfer is a larger fraction of income and has
a bigger effect on the bargaining problem. The wage increase reduces the job finding rate as shown in the
right panel of Figure 2. For reference, the job finding rate was 0.38 at each ability level prior to the policy
change. This fall in the job finding rate manifests itself as an increase in the unemployment rate, more so at
lower ability levels.
Overall, as row 11 in Table 7 reports, the introduction of the UI policy leaves aggregate output essentially
unchanged (falling by less than one-tenth of one percent), despite the increase in labor force participation.
This is due to the fact that the unemployment rate also increases. That is, the increased generosity of the UI
program implies that conditional on participating in the labor force there is a fall in the employment rate,
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which can be seen in the sixth and seventh row in Table 7. Hence, the change in the job finding rate due to
the increased UI essentially cancels the increase in labor force participation, leading overall to a minuscule
fall in the supply of R and NRM labor input, which is observed in the ninth and tenth rows. The reduction
in the labor tax levied on the NRC workers (see the 12th row and below for a discussion) increases slightly
their labor input (see the eighth row) and overall leads to output essentially remaining the same.
In terms of welfare, the UI policy has relatively modest effects, at least relative to the other experiments
reported in Table 7. With respect to the low-skilled, the increase in the UI benefits, and its equilibrium
effects on wages, dominate the increase in the unemployment rate; consumption equivalent welfare rises by
about 2%, with small differences across groups as can be seen in rows 17-25.
Interestingly, as row 26 reports, high-skill workers see essentially no change in their welfare, rising by
about 0.1%. While transfers to the unemployed increase, this is offset by reduced transfers to those outside
the labor force. As a result, the after-tax wages of the high-skilled are almost unchanged.
To summarize, the increase in UI generosity is found to be welfare improving for all groups, though
somewhat modest at the level required to match our labor force participation target.28
6.2.2. Universal Basic Income
Our next experiment introduces a universal basic income transfer program. We model the UBI as an identical
lump sum transfer, UBI > 0, to each individual, irrespective of her skill or labor force status. To make the
policy experiments comparable, we keep the transfer per person the same as in the UI policy case. As an
example, the budget constraint for a routine worker of type εR becomes Ce,εR = ωεR (1−TR)+UBI.29
As the fourth column of Table 7 reports, the UBI program reduces GDP by over 10 percent. This is due to
a fall in the labor force participation and employment of the low-skilled workers, and a fall in the labor input
of the high-skilled workers. What are the reasons for such a difference vs. the UI case analysed previosuly?
As we discuss below, because of its budgetary implications, the UBI program requires a steep increase in
the labor tax rate the NRC group faces, leading to a fall in the supply of their hours worked, which alters the
return to labor force participation for the low-skilled workers in the economy.
28Given the model’s inherent non-linearity, it is an open question as to how welfare would change for larger UI policy interven-
tions.
29As with the case of the UI policy, having an additive term in workers’ budget constraints means that the linearity of the solution
approach discussed in Section 4 is no longer applicable. We follow the same solution approach in Section 6.2.1. Moreover, this
policy experiments adds a new expenditure term to the government budget constraint, eq. 6.
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An Illustrative Simplified Model Again, using a simplified model is helpful in disentangling the channels
through which the policy affects the economy. Figure 3 depicts the results from two simplified models.
First, consider the simplified model we have used in the discussion of the UI policy above, referred to
as Equilibrium/DMP in Figure 3. Under the UBI policy, individuals receive a transfer unconditional on
their employment state. This induces a change in the value of employment, non-participation, as well as
the value of being unemployed. Due to concavity of preferences, the difference between being unemployed
and employed falls, as in the UI case (bottom left panel). This strengthens the worker’s bargaining position
and leads to an increase in the bargained wage (upper left panel) and to a fall in the job finding rate (upper
right panel). Overall, this increase in the value of unemployment, increases the value of participation.
However, unlike the UI case, with UBI, the value of non-participation increases at the same time. Which
force dominates? As depicted in the bottom right panel of Figure 3, in this Equilibrium/DMP case, the value
of unemployment minus the value of non-participation increases, implying that the DMP forces would be
pushing to an increase in participation.
However, the UBI transfers to all individuals in the economy naturally need to be financed. As we show
below, in our full model, this financing requirement induces a massive increase in the distortionary taxation
NRC workers face, leading to a fall in their labor input. Because the NRC workers are complements to the
R and NRM workers, the significant fall in the NRC labor input leads overall to a fall in the wages of R
and NRM workers. To mimic this fall in productivity (which we show below in our full model economy)
in this simplified version, we repeat the Equilibrium/DMP exercise with a single change, where we feed
in a fall in the worker’s productivity that matches the percentage fall in the worker’s productivity as in
our full GE model economy (of about 6 percent). This is depicted as the "Equilibrium/DMP + Prod Fall"
in Figure 3. In this case, the fall in the wage is big enough to overturn the results discussed above, and
the value of non-participation increases vis-a-vis the value of being unemployed (and participating). This
discussion highlights the importance of analysing the effects of UBI within a GE model with government
budget constraints. Without considering the budgetary needs to finance the UBI program, its introduction
would have led to an increase in labor force participation.
The Full GE model The overall effects in our full model economy are presented in the fourth column
in Table 7. The above discussion regarding the relative values of being unemployed or outside the labor
force is reflected in the ability cutoffs for participation in the labor force increasing, as the first two rows in
Table 7 report. As discussed above, all else equal, even though workers receive the UBI both when they are
unemployed and employed, the curvature in the utility implies that, conditional on labor force participation,
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Figure 3: UBI policy
Notes: The x-axis depicts different UBI transfers; a value of 0.3 matches the ratio of the UBI transfer to the wage of
the marginal Routine worker in our economy prior to the introduction of the program. The Equilibrium/DMP line
shows the response to changes in UBI in a simple version of the model with no heterogeneity in production, no taxes,
and no curvature in production. The Equilibrium/DMP+Prod Fall is similar to the Equilibrium/DMP model, but
where we feed a fall in the worker’s productivity that matches the percentage fall in the worker’s productivity due to
the fall in NRC labor input in our full model.
the increase in the value of unemployment versus employment improves the worker’s outside option in
the Nash bargaining: wages increase, job creation falls, and unemployment rises (as in the previous UI
experiment).
However, as rows 13-14 in Table 7 indicate, there is no increase in ωR and ωNRM in equilibrium. As
discussed above, this is because the primary effect of the UBI is its fiscal burden. Financing this transfer
to all individuals requires a stark increase in taxation levied on the NRC workers; it has to increase by 35
percentage points in order to fund the UBI payment (see row 12). This leads to an obvious fall in NRC labor
input of about 13% as the eighth row report. Since NRC labor input is complementary to routine and non-
routine manual work, the large fall in high-skill labor supply reduces the marginal product of low-skilled
labor. As in the simplified model discussion above, this reduces the value of labor force participation being
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Figure 4: UBI policy: Effects on the relative wage and job finding rates
Notes: The x-axis for both figures is log(εR). The support includes productivity to the right of the ε∗R cutoff
reflected in the increase in NLF as reported in the third row.
Figure 4 depict the effects on the wage and the job finding rate of a more generous UBI system within
our full model economy. Consider first the left panel, which depicts the ratio of the new equilibrium wage
to the pre-UBI wage, for each routine ability level, εR. Post-UBI, the wage falls for each ability, by about 6
to 7 percent though less so for the lower ability. First, the fall in the productivity of R workers due to the fall
in the supply of NRC workers is common to all R workers (and similarly for the NRM workers). However,
for these lower ability (and low skilled) workers, the UBI transfer amounts to a bigger fraction of income
and thus strengths their bargaining position by more vis-vis the higher ability low-skilled workers.
This fall in productivity of R workers lowers the job finding rate as shown in the right panel of Figure 4
where we remind the reader that, prior to the introduction of the UBI policy change the job finding rate was
0.38 for each ability. Since wages fall by more for higher ability low-skilled workers, their job finding rates
fall by less relatively to lower ability low-skilled workers. Overall, naturally, this fall in the job finding rates
for R workers manifests itself as an increase in the unemployment rate, more so at the lower ability levels,
as being reflected in the sixth and seventh rows of Table 7.
Overall then, the introduction of the UBI program leads to an increase in the value of non-participation,
drawing workers out of the labor force. This effect is several times larger than the effect of automation itself.
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In terms of welfare, the UBI program delivers significant heterogeneity in effects. Although high-skill
workers receive a UBI transfer, this is more than offset by the fall in after-tax labor income and equity income
(as the economy’s firm owners). As the last row reports, they experience an approximate 22% consumption
equivalent welfare reduction, similar in absolute magnitude to their welfare gain due to automation!
By contrast, the low-skilled experience significant welfare gains. These gains are present especially for
those who choose to remain in, or transition toward, labor force non-participation. However, even the low-
skilled who remain working enjoy an increase in their welfare (although their wages fall) from the mere fact
that the UBI transfer is big enough vis-a-vis their wage and thus it accounts for a significant part of their
income.
6.2.3. Transfers to non-participation
The next policy experiment is one in which transfers to labor force non-participants is increased. As before,
the size of the increase, per each non-participant, is the same in dollar terms to those previously considered.
Not surprisingly, this program leads to a decrease in labor force participation as shown in the fifth column
in Table 7; non-participation rises by 15 percentage points (see the third row). To finance the program, the
distortionary tax rate on high-skill labor increases by 25 p.p (see the 12th row), leading to a fall in NRC
labor input (see the eighth row). As a result of the decrease in both low- and high-skilled labor, aggregate
output falls by 10%.
As with the UBI policy, the high-skilled see a large decrease in after-tax labor income and equity income.
As the last row reports, their welfare falls by 23%. For the low-skilled, the greatest beneficiaries are those
who choose labor force non-participation. These individuals enjoy a rise in welfare as in the UBI case. For
those who remain in the labor force, the exit from participation of the lower ability low-skilled workers
increases their welfare modestly, via the equilibrium effect on their wages; overall this group’s welfare
increases by about half of their increase in the UBI case.
6.2.4. Progressivity of taxation
The policy experiments of Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 indicate much room for redistribution; but such transfer
programs come at a dramatic cost, in terms of aggregate output and distortionary welfare losses for high-skill
workers. Here, in our last experiment, we explore an alternative way to redistribute resources that involves
smaller output and welfare losses for the high-skilled.
Specifically, we consider a more progressive tax system, where we reduce the labor tax rate, TNRM = TR,
that low-skill workers pay. To keep results comparable to those above, we reduce the average tax receipt
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from each worker by the same dollar value as the per recipient transfer of Sections 6.2.1 through 6.2.3. To
accomplish this, the tax rate falls to essentially zero and for simplicity, we set TNRM = TR = 0. Maintaining
government budget balance requires an increase in the labor tax rate levied on high-skill workers.
The sixth and final column in Table 7 reports the effect of this policy. First, in equilibrium, as the 12th
row reports, this policy requires an increase in the tax rate levied on the high skilled of 10 p.p., which is
markedly smaller than those of Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.
The elimination of income taxation on low-skill workers naturally increases their value of participation,
leading to approximately a five percentage point increase in their labor force participation. In contrast, the
tax increase on the high-skilled leads to a fall in their labor supply (see the eighth row), but of lower mag-
nitude than the cases of the UBI and transfers to the NLF policies. These offsetting changes in employment
and labor supply are reflected in the pre-tax wage rates earned in R, NRM, and NRC occupations. These
offsetting changes also imply that there is essentially no impact on aggregate output.
Overall, the increase in the supply of low-skilled and the decrease in the supply of the high-skilled leads to
a pre-tax fall in the low-skilled wages (see rows 13 and 14). However, the after tax wages of the low-skilled
increase by about 10 percent.
This increase in after tax wages implies that, in terms of welfare, this policy experiment delivers similar
welfare gains to the low-skilled that participate in the labor market as the UBI experiment. However, as
opposed to gains being reaped disproportionately by those out of the labor force (who do not see an increase
in their welfare in this tax reform case), increasing the progressivity of taxation favors those who remain in,
and select into, labor force participation. Hence, this is a successful policy in improving the welfare of those
low-skilled workers who participate in the labor market as well as increasing labor force participation.
Finally, we note that this experiment also results in much smaller welfare losses (on the order of 5%) for
the high-skilled relative to the of UBI or increasing transfers to non-participants policies.
6.2.5. Summary and program comparison
To summarize, we use the model to evaluate macroeconomic and distributional impacts of various public
policy proposals. A retraining policy, aimed at restoring labor force participation through improving the
ability of workers in NRM occupations, is successful at doing so at relatively low back-of-the-envelope
cost. It also increases aggregate income. However, it crowds out other low-skill workers, and it is unclear
whether such a retraining program exists in practice at such a large scale.
A policy that increases the generosity of UI benefits is also able to restore labor force participation rates to
pre-automation levels. It raises unemployment, has little impact on aggregate income, and is mildly welfare
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improving to all. For the majority of low-skilled workers, the increase in welfare is about half of the welfare
loss they experienced due to the fall in the ICT price.
By contrast, the introduction of a UBI or an increase in the generosity of transfers to labor force non-
participants reduce labor force participation, labor supply, and aggregate income. Moreover, while increas-
ing welfare to the low-skilled (in the UBI case this welfare increase is bigger in absolute value than the
welfare loss due to automation), they impose large welfare costs to the high-skilled.
Finally, increasing the progressivity of the tax system has strong redistributive effects, raises labor force
participation, has little impact on aggregate income, and imposes relatively small welfare losses to the high-
skilled. For those low-skilled that remain in the labor force, the increase in their welfare is bigger than the
welfare loss they experienced due to the fall in ICT prices.
7. Conclusions
We consider the dramatic change in the occupational composition of employment—specifically, the disap-
pearance of employment in middle-wage routine occupations—observed over the past 35 years. Empirically,
we find that for individuals who were most likely to work in routine occupations, the decline in such job
opportunities was offset by increased likelihood of both labor force non-participation and employment in
low-wage non-routine manual occupations, with the former outcome exceeding the latter approximately
2-to-1.
We develop a heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model with investment in automation capital, labor
force participation and occupational choice, and government policy. When subjected to the empirically ob-
served change in the relative price of ICT capital, the model accounts for about half of the decline in routine
employment, the fall in total labor’s share of national income, and the divergent changes in occupational
labor income.
We use this model to study the aggregate and distributional impact of various public policy proposals; our
experiments are redistributive in nature as government budget balance is maintained through increased tax-
ation of the high-skilled. While a number of programs—including retraining, and unemployment insurance
and labor taxation reforms—are promising, proposals such as universal basic income are highly costly. We
view our framework as useful for the evaluation of many other policies that can differ in implementation,
intensity, and redistributive focus in the face of automation.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Data
A.1.1. CPS Data construction
We adopt the occupational classification system used in Jaimovich and Siu (2012) that affords ease of data
access and replication. The classification is based on the categorization of occupations in the 2000 Stan-
dard Occupational Classification system. Non-routine cognitive workers are those employed in “manage-
ment, business, and financial operations occupations” and “professional and related occupations”. Routine
cognitive workers are those in “sales and related occupations” and “office and administrative support occu-
pations”. Routine manual occupations are “production occupations”, “transportation and material moving
occupations”, “construction and extraction occupations”, and “installation, maintenance, and repair occupa-
tions”. Non-routine manual occupations are “service occupations”. Detailed information on 3-digit occupa-
tional codes are available from the authors upon request.
A.1.2. Classification errors
Our ML approach classifies each person (at each point in time) into one of the four “likely” occupational
groups (NRC, RC, NRM, and RM). However we present our main results aggregating to two workers types
– NRC and non-NRC, hence Tables A1 and A2 show the confusion matrices for those two categories,
separately for men and women respectively. In each matrix we add the precision (share of correctly classified
objects within a predicted category) and recall (share of observed that were picked up by the prediction
within a category) values.
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Table A1: Confusion Matrix - Men
Classified
NRC non-NRC Precision
True
NRC 506,002 294,252 63.23%
non-NRC 242,256 1,213,131 83.35%
Recall 67.62% 80.48%
Table A2: Confusion Matrix - Women
Classified
NRC non-NRC Precision
True
NRC 342,362 150,507 69.46%
non-NRC 241,376 1,167,622 82.87%
Recall 58.65% 88.58%
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Figure A1: Probability of Non-Routine Cognitive by Cell
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Notes: The probability of men in a specific education-age cell to be classified as non-NRC by the random forest
algorithm.
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A.1.3. Recovering true series from series with errors
The classification errors discussed in A.1.2 imply that we do not have “clean” series for the dynamics of
NRC and non-NRC type persons. However, we show now that while we cannot recover perfectly correct
the classification a the individual level, it is possible to correct the aggregate series of interest. Suppose
that we are interested in recovering the share or persons of NRC and non-NRC types in specific labor force
status, and call these xNRC, and xNNRC. Define our observed values from the classifier as xˆNRC, and xˆNNRC,
and define the classification outcomes in terms of the following shares (with the convention STrue|Classi f ied)
as in Table A3:
Table A3: Classification Definitions
Classified
NRC non-NRC
True
NRC SNRC|NRC SNRC|NNRC
non-NRC SNNRC|NRC SNNRC|NNRC
We can then write the observed values as a function of the true values and the share as follows
xˆNRC = SNRC|NRCxNRC +SNNRC|NRCxNNRC
xˆNNRC = SNRC|NNRCxNRC +SNNRC|NNRCxNNRC
Thus if we know the shares in A3, we are left with a simple two-equation two-unknown linear system that
will allow us to recover xNRC and xNNRC. The first way to recover the shares in A3 is to use the classification
errors from the training, reported in section A.1.2. The second approach is to use the restrictions implied by
nature by some of the series. For example, the series or true values of employment share in R occupations for
the NRC type during the training period, should be roughly zero. While the second approach is appealing,
it can only be applied to the occupation series, and not to the NLF series, for which we apply the first
approach. It is important to note that both approaches require the assumption that the classification errors
are not correlated with the labor market status and occupation choice in the post-training period.
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A.2. Model Derivations
A.2.1. Wage functions
Taking the first order condition with respect to wages we have
τ
(
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
)[
U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε
]
= (1− τ)(V˜R,ε (Λ))(1−Tpi)
or
V˜R,ε (Λ) =
[
U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε
] τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
= ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
Where ξ ≡ [U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε ]. Substituting for the marginal value of
workers, and using the first order condition one period ahead, we can right the left hand side as
V˜R,ε (Λ) =U (ωR,ε (1−Te,R,ε))−U (bR,εωR,ε (1−Tu,R,ε))+β (1−δ −µ (θR,εR))V˜R,ε
(
Λ′
)
=
=U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε)+β (1−δ −µ (θR,εR))ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
Substitute for the marginal value of the firm we can write the right hand side as follows:
ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
=
ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
[
(1−Tpi)( fRεRPR−ωR,εR)+(1−δ )β
∂J
(
x′R,εR ,Λ
′)
∂x′R,εR
]
Therefore we have
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U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε)+β (1−δ −µ (θR,εR))ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
=
ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
[
(1−Tpi)( fRεRPR−ωR,εR)+(1−δ )β
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
]
⇒
U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε)−βµ (θR,εR)ξ
τ
1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
=
ξ
τ
1− τ ( fRεRPR−ωR,εR)
⇒
1− τ
τ
1
ξ
(U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε))−βµ (θR,εR)
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
=
fRεRPR−ωR,εR
⇒
ωR,εR = fRεRPR−
1− τ
τ
1
ξ
(U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε))+βθR,εRq(θR,εR)
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
where we substitute the relationship µ (θR,εR) = θR,εRq(θR,εR). Finally, we can use the steady state version
of the first order condition for vacancies (1−Tpi)κR,εR = E
[
βq(θR,εR)
∂J
(
x′R,εR ,Λ
′
)
∂x′R,εR
]
. This yields the general
wage function
ωR,εR = fRεRPR−
1− τ
τ
1
ξ
(U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε))+θR,εRκR,εR =
fRεRPR− 1− ττ
U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε)
U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε +θR,εRκR,εR
When we assume a CRRA utility function U (C) = C
1−σ
1−σ and that there are no lump sum transfers to
workers who are in the labor force then we can simplify further:
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U (Ce,R,ε)−U (Cu,R,ε)
U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε =
(Ce,R,ε )
1−σ
1−σ −
(Cu,R,ε )
1−σ
1−σ
(Ce,R,ε)
−σ (1−Te,R,ε)− (Ce,R,ε)−σ (1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε
=
1
1−σ
(ωR,εR (1−Te,R,ε))1−σ − (bR,εωR,εR (1−Tu,R,ε))1−σ
(ωR,εR (1−Te,R,ε))−σ (1−Te,R,ε)− (bR,εωR,εR (1−Tu,R,ε))−σ (1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε
=
1
1−σ
(ωR,εR)
1−σ (1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (ωR,εR)1−σ (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
(ωR,εR)
−σ (1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (ωR,εR)−σ (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
=
1
1−σ
(ωR,εR)
1−σ
[
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
(ωR,εR)
−σ
[
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
] =
1
1−σ ωR,εR
and as a result the wage function simplifies to
ωR,εR = fRεRPR+θR,εRκR,εR−
1− τ
τ
1
1−σ ωR,εR
⇒
ωR,εR =
1
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[ fRεRPR+θR,εRκR,εR ]
Armed with this wage function we move to the optimality condition for vacancies
κR,εR
q(θR,εR)
= β
[
fRεRPR−ωR,εR +(1−δ )
κR,εR
q(θR,εR)
]
Substituting the wage function we have
κR,εR
q(θR,εR)
= β
[
fRεRPR− 1
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[ fRεRPR+θR,εRκR,εR ]+ (1−δ )
κR,εR
q(θR,εR)
]
and once we add the assumption that hiring cost if proportional to productivity we get
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κ0
q(θR,εR)
= β
[
1− 1
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0]+ (1−δ )
κ0
q(θR,εR)
]
κ0
q(θR,εR)
(1−β (1−δ )) = β
1−τ
τ
1
1−σ −θR,εRκ0
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
κ0
[
1−β (1−δ )
q(θR,εR)
+β
θR,εR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
]
= β
1−τ
τ
1
1−σ
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
κ0 =
β
1−τ
τ
1
1−σ
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
1−β (1−δ )
q(θR,εR)
+β θR,εR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
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A.3. Productivity cutoffs
Denote the value of staying out of the labor force by Vo,ε , a constant number in steady state.
The value of employment in occupation R with idiosyncratic productivity εR is
Ve,R,ε =
(ωR,εR (1−Te,R,εR))1−σ
1−σ +β (1−δ )Ve,R,ε +βδVu,R,ε
Ve,R,ε =
1
1−β (1−δ )

(
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0] (1−Te,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ
+ βδ1−β (1−δ )Vu,R,ε
where we substituted the explicit wage function under the assumption of proportional hiring costs.
The value of unemployment in occupation R with idiosyncratic productivity εR is
Vu,R,ε =
(bR,εRωR,εR (1−Tu,R,εR))1−σ
1−σ +β (1−µ (θR,εR))Vu,R,ε +βµ (θR,εR)Ve,R,ε
Vu,R,ε (1−β ) =

(
bR,εR
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0] (1−Tu,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ
+βµ (θR,εR) [Ve,R,ε −Vu,R,ε ]
Note that the first order condition of the bargaining problem implies that
Ve,R,ε −Vu,R,ε = ξ τ1− τ
1
1−Tpi
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
and the first order condition with respect to vacancies implies that
∂J (xR,εR ,Λ)
∂xR,εR
=
(1−Tpi)κ0PR fRεR
βq(θR,εR)
Substituting, we have
Vu,R,ε (1−β ) =

(
bR,εR
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0] (1−Tu,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ

+θR,εRξ
τ
1− τ κ0PR fRεR
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Now we can substitute for ξ , taking into account the CRRA assumption
ξ =U ′ (Ce,R,ε)(1−Te,R,ε)−U ′ (Cu,R,ε)(1−Tu,R,ε)bR,ε
= (ωR,εR)
−σ
[
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
=
(
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0]
)−σ [
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
Therefore
Vu,R,ε (1−β ) =

(
bR,εR
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0] (1−Tu,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ

+
(
fRεRPR
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
[1+θR,εRκ0]
)−σ [
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
θR,εR
τ
1− τ κ0PR fRεR
= ( fRPRεR)1−σ

(
bR,εR
1+θR,εRκ0
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
(1−Tu,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ +(
1+θR,εRκ0
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
)−σ [
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
θR,εR
τ
1− τ κ0

or
Vu,R,ε =
( fRPRεR)1−σ
1−β

(
bR,εR
1+θR,εRκ0
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
(1−Tu,R,εR)
)1−σ
1−σ +(
1+θR,εRκ0
1+ 1−ττ
1
1−σ
)−σ [
(1−Te,R,ε)1−σ − (1−Tu,R,ε)1−σ b1−σR,ε
]
θR,εR
τ
1− τ κ0

Note that the term in brackets is constant in steady state because it is a combination of exogenous parame-
ters and the tightness ratio, which we have shown to be independent of the productivity parameters. Defining
the term in brackets by kR and the analogue for NRM by kNRM we can express the values of unemployment
in both occupations as
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Vu,R,ε =
( fRPRεR)1−σ
1−β kR
Vu,R,ε =
( fNRMPNRMεNRM)1−σ
1−β kNRM
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A.4. Derivation of Change in Welfare by Group
The welfare change due to automation for those who switched form R to NRM is given by
∆ROLD→NRMNEW =

UNεNRM
EMPεNRM +UNεNRM
kNRM
1−β +
EMPεNRM
EMPεNRM +UNεNRM
 (1−β (1−µ(θεNRM )))1−β kR− b
1−σ
εNRM(1−Tu,εNRM)
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θε,NRM)


1
1−σ
fNRMPNEWNRM E (εNRm)
ROLD→NRMNEW

UNεR
EMPεR +UNεR
kR
1−β+
EMPεR
EMPεR +UNεR
 (1−β (1−µ(θεR )))1−β kR− b
1−σ
εR (1−Tu,εR)
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θε,R)


1
1−σ
fRPOLDR E (εR)
ROLD→NRMNEW
which given our calibration targets can be simplified to
∆ROLD→NRMNEW =
fNRMPNEWNRM E (εNRm)
ROLD→NRMNEW
fRPOLDR E (εR)
ROLD→NRMNEW
where we note that in the numerator we draw the εNRM abilities for these individuals that transitions to NRM.
The average change in welfare for R workers who leave the labor force is given by
∆
ROLD→NLFNEW =
1
1−β
1
1−σ (bO)
1
1−σ

UNεR
EMPεR +UNεR
kR
1−β+
EMPεR
EMPεR +UNεR
 (1−β (1−µ(θεR )))1−β kR− b
1−σ
εR (1−Tu,εR)
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θε,R)


1
1−σ
fRPOLDR E (εR)
ROLD→NLFNEW
Note that by definition, there is an individual who is indifferent between participating in the labor force
and not. Then, since the value of being outside of the labor force does not change in this analysis, we can
rewrite the above expression as
∆ROLD→NLFNEW =
ε∗,OLDR
E (εR)R
OLD→NLFNEW
The average change in the consumption equivalence for those who worked in Non-Routine Manual oc-
cupations, and continued working in Non-Routine Manual occupations is given by
∆NRMOLD→NRMNEW =
PNEWNRM
POLDNRM
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The average change in consumption equivalent welfare for those who were outside the labor force and
started working in Non-Routine-Manual occupations post-automation is given by
∆
NLFOLD→NRMNEW =

UNεNRM
EMPεNRM +UNεNRM
kNRM
1−β +
EMPεNRM
EMPεNRM +UNεNRM
 (1−β (1−µ(θεNRM )))1−β kNRM− b
1−σ
εNRM(1−Tu,εNRM)
1−σ
1−σ
βµ(θε,NRM)


1
1−σ
fNRMP
NEW
NRM E(εNRM)
NLFOLD→NRMNEW
1
1−β
1
1−σ (bO)
1
1−σ
As above, given the cutoff value of those individuals who are outside the labor force we can rewrite this
expression as
∆NLFOLD→NRMNEW =
PNEWNRM E (εNRM)
NLFOLD→NRMNEW
POLDNRMε
∗,OLD
NRM
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A.5. Alternative calibration of ρ
Table A4: Alternative calibration with ρ = 0.5
ICT Retraining UI UBI NLF Taxation
Change Benefits
Labor states
Φ NLF 2.091 -2.149 -2.133 5.751 14.743 -5.013
Φ R -3.896 0.526 1.584 -4.673 -11.279 3.709
Φ NRM 1.805 1.623 0.550 -1.078 -3.464 1.304
Emp. Rate R 0.950 0.95 0.945 0.945 0.950 0.950
Emp. Rate NRM 0.950 0.95 0.944 0.944 0.950 0.950
∆YNRC 1.200 0.379 0.119 -14.439 -7.858 -2.163
∆YR -4.155 1.316 0.302 -4.648 -11.965 2.973
∆YNRM 9.664 4.144 -0.438 -3.548 -12.495 3.784
∆ GDP 12.140 1.327 0.282 -9.920 -9.748 0.195
Φ NRC labor tax 0.00 -1.524 -0.449 35.500 24.587 10.355
Wages
∆ωR -6.154 -0.093 0.516 -7.142 3.240 -4.112
∆ωNRM 2.149 -3.129 0.730 -6.139 2.747 -3.590
∆ωNRC 23.373 0.901 0.001 8.108 -3.587 4.451
∆ωNRC : after tax 23.373 0.766 0.157 -11.240 -9.151 -2.606
Welfare: Consumption Equivalence
∆ : ROld → ∆RNew -6.60 0.80 1.96 6.18 3.29 10.20
∆ : ROld → ∆NRMNew -1.70 NA 2.34 9.09 NA 10.50
∆ : ROld → ∆NLFNew -3.60 0.20 NA 26.50 16.50 NA
∆ : NRMOld → ∆RNew NA -1.00 NA NA 3.04 NA
∆ : NRMOld → ∆NRMNew 2.50 -2.50 2.15 6.77 2.78 10.80
∆ : NRMOld → ∆NLFNew NA -1.60 NA 27.08 16.27 NA
∆ : NLFOld → ∆RNew NA NA 2.28 NA NA 5.83
∆ : NLFOld → ∆NRMNew 1.90 10.44 2.39 NA NA 6.10
∆ : NLFOld → ∆NLFNew 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.60 34.66 0.00
∆ : NRCOld → ∆NRCNew 22.30 2.05 0.72 -21.70 -22.50 -5.30
Notes: (i) Φ denotes percentage point change; (ii) ∆ denotes percentage change; (iii) the reference point for the first
column is the steady state beofre the ICT price decline; (iv) the reference point for columns 2-6 is the steady state after
the ICT price decline.
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Table A5: Alternative calibration with ρ =−0.5
ICT Retraining UI UBI NLF Taxation
Change Benefits
Labor states
Φ NLF 2.258 -2.186 -2.356 6.202 15.624 -5.626
Φ R -3.742 0.373 1.628 -4.897 -11.877 4.089
Φ NRM 1.484 1.733 0.723 -1.308 -3.837 1.533
Emp. Rate R 0.950 0.95 0.946 0.946 0.950 0.950
Emp. Rate NRM 0.950 0.95 0.946 0.946 0.950 0.950
∆YNRC 1.232 0.237 0.179 -13.886 -8.249 -1.882
∆YR -3.335 0.053 -0.291 -5.671 -13.349 2.942
∆YNRM 5.458 6.160 -0.666 -4.868 -14.480 4.457
∆ GDP 11.894 0.733 -0.256 -10.422 -10.900 -0.095
Φ NRC labor tax 0.00 -1.281 -0.650 35.290 25.816 9.664
Wages
∆ωR -7.231 0.091 -0.303 -7.447 2.917 -4.788
∆ωNRM 6.434 -5.453 0.443 -5.604 3.529 -4.406
∆ωNRC 23.224 0.696 -0.435 6.972 -4.443 4.241
∆ωNRC : after tax 23.224 0.796 0.145 -14.375 -12.314 -3.051
Welfare: Consumption Equivalence
∆ : ROld → ∆RNew -7.00 1.42 1.78 6.24 3.65 10.00
∆ : ROld → ∆NRMNew -0.40 NA 3.00 15.04 3.87 10.21
∆ : ROld → ∆NLFNew -4.30 NA NA 25.70 16.30 NA
∆ : NRMOld → ∆RNew NA -1.62 NA NA NA NA
∆ : NRMOld → ∆NRMNew 6.64 -4.35 2.50 7.99 4.10 10.43
∆ : NRMOld → ∆NLFNew NA -2.55 NA 26.82 16.90 NA
∆ : NLFOld → ∆RNew NA 0.90 2.16 NA NA 5.71
∆ : NLFOld → ∆NRMNew 4.00 9.96 2.51 NA NA 5.98
∆ : NLFOld → ∆NLFNew 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.60 33.60 0.00
∆ : NRCOld → ∆NRCNew 22.46 1.81 0.00 -22.50 -24.00 -5.30
Notes: (i) Φ denotes percentage point change; (ii) ∆ denotes percentage change; (iii) the reference point for the first
column are relative to the steady state before the ICT price decline; (iv) the reference point for columns 2-6 is the
steady state after the ICT price decline.
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A.6. Elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits
In the context of the UI and UBI experiment, a key channel through which these policies operate is via the
bargaining problem and its impact on the wage and vacancies posting by firms. To discipline our analysis we
required the model to match the elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits; different
values of this elasticity have vastly different implications for the impact of different policy reforms. As such
we require our model to match an elasticity value of 1, which is within the range of the empirical counterpart
(see for example Meyer (1990) and Chetty (2008)).
To match this elasticity in the model we solve for the labor market equilibrium for different individuals
and for different values of unemployment transfers. We then estimate the aggregate resulting tightness ratio
and job finding rates, from which we calculate the elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment
transfers. We follow the approach in Yedid-Levi (2016) that allows us to match the elasticity of unem-
ployment duration to unemployment benefits, while maintaining log preferences. In this modification we
introduce an additional parameter that links the bargaining power of the worker with labor market tightness,
in a way that tames the response of wages to changes in UI benefits. Formally, the bargaining power τ is
now expressed as τ (θ) = τ0
τ0+(1−τ0)( θssθ )
ζ .30
Importantly, this implies that this alternative parametrization of the model does not affect any of the
results presented until Section 6 since the value of τ is not changed as long as the tightness ratio does not
deviate from its steady state value. Indeed in Section 5 following the ICT price change the tightness ratio is
not altered.
To identify ζ we repeat the discussed above analysis and reestimate the elasticity of unemployment
duration to unemployment benefits until the model matches the micro elasticity, converging on a value of
ζ = 20.
Thus to summarize, until section 6, given that the unemployment rate is constant, the elasticity of un-
employment duration to unemployment benefits is quantitatively an irrelevant moment. In Section 6 where
unemployment reacts to the changes in UI and UBI, we verify that the model matches the observed micro
elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits.
30Note that when ζ = 0 then the model converges to the benchmark case with constant bargaining power.
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